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I M T R O P y C Y I O H 
Amongst the different branches of philosophy, 
epistemology holds an Important position. Although 
for more than two thousand years, it has been occu-
pying a considerable place in philosophy, it's signi-
ficance has yet not been, anyway, dimmed^ If a com-
parison is made between Ancient and Modern epistemology 
we will notice an evidential difference in their approach 
and methodology. But, the problems of epistemology, to 
a large extent, have remained unchanged. The term 
•epistemology' is derived from the Greek word episteme, 
meaning knowledge. And, thus, epistemology is that 
branch of philosophy which deals with the problems, per-
taining to the origin ( i.e. sources ), nature and vali-
dity of knowledge. Our aim, in this essay, is to make 
a critical study of al-Ghazali's epistemology. Before 
entering into this we may give a historical sketch of 
epistemology starting from Greek philosophy down to the 
pre-Ghazalian Muslim thought. 
SECTION 1, EPISTEMOLOGY IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY; 
The pre-Socratic philosophers, the earliest 
philosophers of the Western tradition, did not give any 
fundamental attention to this branch of philosophy, for 
they were primarily concerned with the nature and 
1. Titus, Harold, H. 
Living Issues in Philosophy,3rd ed. 
New York: American Book Company Ltd.1953,p.38. 
possibility of change. They took it for granted that 
knowledge of nature was possible, although some of 
them suggested that knowledge of the structure of 
reality could better come from some other sources. 
Thus, Heraclitus ( fl. 504 B.C, )emphasi2ed the use 
of the senses, and Parmenides ( fl. 501 B.C.) in effect 
stressed the role of reason. But none of them doubted 
2 
that knowledge of reality was possible, Xenophanes 
( fC, 540 B.C.), as his surviving fragments are ex-
plained by the later writers, seems to have a sceptical 
3 
view with regard to the possibility of human knowledge. 
He, also, explicitly denies the possibility of knowledge 
4 
of divine revelation, Parmenides, on the other hand, 
holds that knowledge can be acquired by divine revela-
tion, and makes it clear that such knowledge is something 
wholly distinct from what common sense regards as know-
5 
ledge, Democritus, the most prominent figure among the 
6 
Atomists, appears to have some concern about knowledge. 
2. Edwards, Paul, ed. 
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed,,New York: 
The Macmillan Co,& The Free Press,Vol.S 1967,p,9-
3, O'Connor, D.J,ed. A Critical History of Western 
Philosophy, London, The Free Press 
of Glencoe Collier-Macraillan Ltd. 
1964, p, 7-
4. Ibid,, P. 8. 
5, Loccit, 
6, Ibid,, p, 12 
For the explanation of the sensible qualities he 
emphasizes the need for differences in shapes; and 
it would be without reason to deny differences in 
size, as well as to restrict the amount of the 
7 
difference. Sceptical attitude toward the possibi-
lity of the knowledge of reality chiefly emerged in 
the philosophy of the Sophists who asked how much 
of what we think we know about nature is really an 
objective part of it and how much is contributed by 
8 
the human mind. Indeed, do we have any knowledge of 
the nature as it really is? Protagoras ( about b. 
483 B.C.), seems to have held, as reported by Plato, 
that every thing is as it appears to a man, that 
appearances are the only reality. His famous dictiim 
is "man is the measure of all things, of the things 
that are, that they are, of the things that are not, 
9 
that they are not. Gorglas' view is more radical, 
according to which there is no such thing as reality, 
if there is, we could not know of it, and that even 
we could know of it, we could not communicate our 
knowledge of it. 
7. CLARK, GORDON H. 
Thales to Dewey; A History of Philosophy 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,1937,p.36-
8. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3, P. 9. 
9. O'Connor, A Critical History ot Western Philosophy, 
p. 13-
't 
This general sceptical attitude towards 
knowledge led to the beginning of epistetnology as 
it has been traditionally known—the attempt to jus-
tify the claim that knowledge is possible and to 
assess the part played by the senses and reason in 
the acquisition of knowledge. Plato (C-428-347 B.C.) 
is considered by almost all the philosophers as the 
real originator of epistemology, for he attempted to 
deal with the basic question: What is knowledge? 
Where is knowledge generally found, and how much of 
what we ordinarily think we know is really knowledge? 
Do the senses provide knowledge? Can reason supply 
knowledge? What is the relation between knowledge and 
10 
true belief? In connection with the sources of know-
ledge Plato was not ready to accept the role of sense-
experience. He reserved the term "knowledge" for a 
kind of awareness or acquaintance with a world of quite 
distinct entities called forms which lies beyond the 
11 
reach of the senses, 
Aristotle ( 389-322 B.C. ), like Plato, main-
tained that knowledge is always of the universal. In 
10. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol, 3, p, 9-
11. Ibid,, p, 10-
5 
so far as we claim to know particular things, we 
know them as instances of a universal in the parti-
cular. But it must be clarified that, as Aristotle 
holds, universals are inherent in particulars; he 
strongly rejects the Platonic notion of a world of 
separate Universals or Forms, The only exception to 
the inherence of forms in 'matter' and God and the 
most divine part of us, reason is in thejhighest sense. 
Knowledge, therefore, depends ultimately on the soul's 
12 
or mind's reception of the forms of things. 
Aristotle maintains that higher faculties 
depend .for their existence on the lower. The exer-
cise of the intellect, which is in itself nothing but 
a mere faculty, depends on the prior exercise of sense-
perception. Hence, Aristotle says, the soul never 
thinks without an image. Owing to the influence of 
Thomas Aquinas, this has often been interpreted as tne 
13 
basis of empiricism. 
It is said that if any one in the ancient 
period was an empiricist, it was Epicurus ( 341-270 B.C) 
the leading Greek atomist. 
12. Ibid., p. 12-
13. Ibid., P. 13. 
In his canonice can be found a theory of knowledge 
and methodology, Epicurus insists upon the fact that 
all knowledge rests upon sensation. Sensations are 
the result of contact with a sense organ on the part 
of "eidola", i.e., films of atoms, given off by 
objects. Sensation is thus immediate and admits of 
no check. Hence, it is useless to look for any other 
source of knowledge, he seems to have held that in 
some sense every sensation is true. 
The Stoic School was the another important 
school of thought in Greek Philosophy which got some 
interest in epistemological problems. Zeno (fl.c.300 
B.C.) was the founder of that school, but the main 
figure was, perhaps Chrysippus ( C.280-C,204 B.C.). 
The Stoics not only rejected the Platonic doctrine of 
the transcendental universal, but also, Aristotle's 
doctrine of the concrete universal. Only the individual 
exists and our knowledge is knowledge of particular 
objects. These particulars make an impression on the 
soul, and knowledge is primarily knowledge of this 
15 
impression. The Stoic stand was, therefore. Empiricist, 
14. O'Connor-A Critical History of Western Philosophy 
P. 65-
15. Copleston, Frederick, A History of Philosophy,Vgl.l 
London: Burns Gates & Washbourne Ltd. 1956, p. 386* 
even "sensualistlc". However, they also maintained a 
Rationalism which is scarcely consistent with a tho-
roughly empiricist and nominalist position. For, they 
hold that reason is a product of development. In that 
it grows up gradually out of perceptions and is formed 
only about the fourteenth year. They also maintain 
that not only there are deliberately formed general' 
ideas, but also such general ideas as are apparently 
antecedent to experience in that- we have a natural pre-
disposition to form them,— virtually^innate ideas',as 
we may call them. What is more, it is only through the 
reason that the system of reality can be known. 
The sceptics were making attaks upon the dogmatic 
schools, as they called them. The general tendency of 
this school was to accept the doctrine of impressions 
and phantasiae. The arguments they put against dogmatism 
were initially unsystematic, but gradually they got an 
orderly shape. Probably, under Aenesidemus ( first 
century B.C.) a list of ten ( or eight ) arguments was 
drawn up. Some of these were forms of the argument from 
illunion, stressing the possibility of illusion and error 
in order to suggest that there was no reason to think 
16. Ibid., p. 387. 
8 
that we ever gain knowledge of the real truths about 
things. Perceptions, they said, are always relative 
to the circumstances, the perceiver and so on. Hence, 
no phantasia is a criterion of truth, and nothing else 
can be, 
Plotinus, the founder of the Neoplatonic school, 
was responsible for the revival of Platonism In the 
third century A.D. This movement was mystical in it's 
trend. Nevertheless, Plotinus often uses Aristotelian 
notions, sometimes with Platonic twist. The soul, as 
opposed to body, is given pre-eminence, so that per-
18 
ception and knowledge make the soul f\inction. Porphyry 
(A.D. 232/3) set himself to propound the doctrine of 
Plotinus in a clear and comprehensive manner, but he 
laid more emphasis on the practical and religious sides, 
than even what Plotinus had done. The end of philosophy, 
to him, is 'salvation', and the soul must purify itself 
by turning its attention from what is lower to what is 
higher, a purification to be accomplished by asceticism 
19 
;,n<i knowledge of God, 
17. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol, 3, p. 14» 
18. Ibid., P. 14-
19. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, P. 473 
J 
Augustine ( 354-430 A.D.) was influenced by 
Neoplatonism, although he held a significantly diffe-
rent view on the heterodox views of it. He took it 
for granted that knowledge of God was possible, and he 
20 felt no further need to question this assumption, 
Augustine's vindication of the possibility of reliable 
knowledge proceeds along with two fronts, according to 
the fundamental distinction he makes between two kinds 
of objects and their two corresponding kinds of know-
ledge. Accordingly, there are two classes of things 
known; one consisting of these which the mind perceives 
through the bodily senses, and the other, of those which 
it perceives through itself. The first embraces the 
objects of the five senses, that is, the material world, 
while the second is the intelligible world, known by 
the mind independently of sense-experience. Among the 
objects of this second mode of knowledge is included 
the mind itself, which according to Augustine, was known 
21 
to itself without the intermediary of any sense-experience, 
In describing the discovery of self-knowledge, Augustine 
maintains that as the mind's discovery of itself in the 
very process of seeking itself, is not as an object it 
20. Op.cit, p. 14« 
21. O'Connor, A Critical History of Western Philosophy 
PP. 84-85' 
0 
comes across but as the subject and agent of its 
22 
Intellectual quest. All knowledge, Augustine points 
out, is the work of the soul. This he defines asla 
"substance endowed with reason and fitted to rule the 
body".^^ 
SECTION II EPISTEMOLOGY IN PRE-GHAZALIAN MUSLIM THOUGHT 
Before making any attempt to elucidate the 
views of the different Muslim thinkers in connection 
with the problem of epistemology, it will be perhaps 
proper to see whether the main two sources of Muslim 
philosophy - the Qur'an and the Hadith do have any 
say on this problem. In the Qur'an some references 
are made in connection with human knowledge. Man alone 
24 
has been given the capacity to use names for things 
and so has been given the knowledge which even the 
25 
angels do not possess. Among men those who are granted 
26 
wisdom are indeed granted great good. The aim of the 
22. Ibid,, p, 85-
23, Loc.cit. 
24 
• (The translation of the verses given here are taken 
from Abdullah Yusuf All's translation of the Qur'an) 
(^ urlsn, Vt,3i-
25. Ibid., ii, 32-
26. Ibid., ii, 269-
intellect is to know truth from error. As an ideal 
or basic virtue for man, wisdom means the knowledge 
of facts, ideals, and values, 
M.M. Sharif with reference to the Qur'afnic verses 
hold that there are three degrees of knowledge in the 
ascending scale of certitude, (i) Knowledge by inference 
27 
( ^ilm al-yaqln), (ii) Knowledge by perception and 
c - 2^ 
reported perception or observation ( *ain al-yaqin), and 
,InP-(iii) knowledge by personal experience ( haqq al-Yaqii 
a distinction which may be exemplified by my certitude of 
(1) Water always quenches (2) it has quenched Zaid's 
thirst, (3) it has quenched my thirst. Likewise,there 
are three types of errors: (1) The errors of reasoning, 
(ii) the errors of observation, and (iii) the errors of 
intuition. Prof. M.M, Sharif elucidates the above men-
30 
tioned three degrees of the Qur'anic concept of knowledge: 
The first type of knowledge depends either on the truth 
of its presupposition as in deduction, or it is only 
probable as in induction. There is greater certitude 
about our knowledge based on experience ( observation or 
experiment) of phenomena, , 
27. Ibid.,c ii, 5-
28. Ibid., c ii, 7-
29. Ibid., Lxix 51-
30. Sharif, M.M. ed. 
A History of Muslim Philosophy, 
Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, Vol, 1, 1963 PP.147,48, 
49,50. 
The second type of knowledge is either scien-
tific knowledge based on experience ( observation and 
experiment) or historical knowledge based on reports 
or descriptions of actual experiences. All reports 
are not trust worthy. Therefore, special attention 
should be paid to the character of the reporter. If 
he is a man of shady character, his report should be 
31 
carefully checked. 
Scientific knowledge comes from the study of 
natural phenomena. These natural phenomena are the 
32 
signs of God, symbols of ultimate reality or expres-
sions of the truth, as human behaviour is the expres-
sion of the human mind. Natural laws are the set of 
33 
ways of God in which there is no change. The study 
of nature, of the heavens and earth, is enlightening for 
34 
the men of understanding. The alteration of day and 
35 
night enables them to measure serial time. They can 
know the ways of God, the laws of nature by observing 
all things of varying colours-mountains, rivers, fields 
of corn, or other form of vegetation, gardens of olives, 
31. Op,cit. XLIX,6. 
32. Ibid., ii 164, ii 164, 219, iii. 190; vi. 7,95-99; 
X,3-6; xili, 2-4^ xviii, 12 - 190, vi, 95-99, x 3-6. 
33. Ibid., xvii, 77-
34. Ibid., iii, I90f 
35. Ibid., iii; 190; xvii, 12-
^3 
date-palms, grapes, and fruit of all kinds, thereof 
36 
watered with the same water, yet varying in quality; 
by studying birds poised under the sky and thinking 
37 
how they are so held up,and likewise by observing 
38 
the clouds and wondering how they are made. Those 
who think can know God and can conquer aj.1 that is 
39 
in the heavens and the earth: right and day, and the 
40 
sun, the moon, and the stars , knowledge of the pheno-
menal world which the senses yield is not an illusion, 
41 
but a blessing for which we must be thankful, 
God reveals His signs not only in the experience 
of the outer world ( afaq ) and its historical vistas, 
but also through the inner experience of minds (anfus). 
Thus, the inner or the personal experience is the third 
source of knowledge. Experience from this source gives 
42 
the highest degree of certitude. Divine guidance comes 
to his creatures in the first instance from this source. 
The forms of knowledge that come through this source 
are (i) divinely-determined movement—movement deter-
43 44 
mined by natural causes, as in the earth, and the heavens 
36, Ibid' xvi, HyJ*-»3-
37, Ibid., xxiv iii, 13-16-
38, From this source. The forms of knowledge 
38. Ibid., XXIV, II 13-16, xvi,l4, LV 13 • ' 
40, Ibid,, iii, 190-
41, Ibid., xvi, 73, xxxii 9-
42, Ibid., xvi, 78; xxxii, 9-
43, Ibid., L,7-8; Li , 68. 
44, Ibid, XLi, 68. 
(2) instinct, e.g. in the bee to build its cell. 
(3) intuition or knowledge by the heart 
(4) inspiration as in the case of Moses' mother when 
46 
she cast her tenderly suckled child into the river, 
47 
(6) revelation as in the case of all true prophets^ 
God's messengers. 
About knowledge some references are, also, 
found in the Traditions of the Prophet(s) - Intellect 
(*aql) is considered by the Prophet as a very signi-
ficant thing in religion. So, many sayings are found 
in connection with the significance of intellect and 
its application. The Prophet said; God has not created 
anything more honourable than intellect. Dr. Iqbal 
considers that the search for rational foundations in 
Islam may be regarded to have begun with the Prophet(s) 
himself. His constant prayer was: 'Godl grant me know-
48 
ledge of ultimate nature ot things'. 
46. Ibid., ii, 97; xxvi, l93-95;XLi, 30-31; Liii, 10-11 
47. Ibid., XXVIII,78-
48. Iqbal, Mohammad, The Reconstruction of Religious 
Thought in Islam, printed in India ,Eielhi, 
Bombay, Madras, Oriental Publishers 
Distributors, 1975, P. 3. 
"Wisdom is the believer's straying camel; he takes 
it from whatever he may find it, and does not care 
from what vessel it has been issued, the philosophers 
of Islam like the theologians, had no difficulty in 
finding the appropriate sayings of the Prophet to 
justify their activities. This tradition also 
suggests the activityof the different sources of 
knowledge. 
Apart from the Qur'an and Traditions of the 
_fAlI 
Prophetls), Amir-ul-MuminIn/has also dealt with the 
problems of knowledge. According to him,"knowledge 
is of two kinds, natural and acquired, acquired know-
ledge is useless without the other, just as the light 
of the sun rendered useless, when the light of the eye 
49 is closed," 
If we have a look at the different schools' that 
emerged in the history of Muslim philosophy we see 
four main schools, e.g. Mu'taziliam, . Ashlar ism 
Philosophers (Falaslfa) and Sufism , which seem to have 
49, Al-Ghazali, quotes this saying of Hadrat fAli, in 
his Ihya' ^Ulum id.. Din, Enq. tr. Karim,Faglul, 
New De'lhi,Kitab Bhawan, 1982, • Vol.I^P.115. 
For a detailed study of Amir ul-Miiminln '"All*s views 
on knowledge one may study Nabj al~Ba€a^ah, 
translations of which are available in Urdu, 
English,Persian and many other languages. 
() 
Some concern on epistemological problems. Apart 
from these four schools there is another school— 
the Ikhwan as-safa which made significant contri-
bution to epistemology. Regarding the sources of 
knowledge the schools hold different views but all 
of them accept the authenticity of revelation. The 
miin point of their controversy dn this issue arose 
on the interpretation of revelation. The Mu^taziia? 
and the philosophers hold that reason is competent 
enough to explain and interpret the different verses 
of the Qur'ao. The Ash'ariyas maintain that Kalamfijfl,, 
demonstrative reason) has to be applied in explaining 
them. The real difference between the Miftazilah and 
the Asha^ iarah is as to which is prior, reason or reve-
lation. The Mu'tazilah are inclined toward a more 
retionalist approach them the Asl/aTirah. The Sufis on 
the otherhand stress the role of intuition (KagJjf) in 
the interpretation of the Qur'an. But on the whole, 
Sufis ,were not totally averse to reason. Some Sufis 
developed rigorously rationalist systems of ideas, 
though they mainly relied upon mystic, experience, for 
instance, al-Ghazali regards intuition (kashf) as a 
higher form of reason. We may now, give a brief account 
of the epistemological position of the above mentioned 
main schools of Muslim philosophy. 
' / 
MU^TAZILISM 
The main problems that were taken up by Mu'*tazilism 
were defence of the Unity of God and His justice. Thds 
is why, they are termed as "people of unity and justice" 
50 
(Ahl at-tawhid wa'1-^adl). They place particular stress 
on reason—they consider reason as the principal source 
of knowledge. But they do not undermine the signifi-
cance of revelation, rather their insistence on reason 
is based on the Qur'an. Revelation and reason, to 
the Mu'*tazilas, ^^^ the sources of knowledge and cri-
teria of distinguishing between good an evil. Therefore, 
they must be in harmony. But if there appears any in-
consistency between reason and literal meaning of reve-
lation, the literal meaning should be rejected and 
some deep meaning, which conforms to reason, should be 
51 
sought out. Thus, reason has got a better position 
than revelation, as the source of knowledge, in their 
philosophy. 
50. Sharif, ed. A History of Muslim Philosophy,Vol.1 
P. 200-
51. Hai, Saiyed Abdul, Muslim Philosophy 
Dhaka: islamic Foundation Bangladesh, Vol. 1 
2nd., 1982, P. 76. 
ASa*^ARISM; 
Ash*arism emerged as a philosophico-rellgious 
school of thought in Islam during the fourth and fifth 
A.H./ tenth and eleventh centuries A.D, It laid the 
foundation of an orthodox Islamic theology or orthodox 
Kalam, as opposed to the rationalist Kalam of the 
Mu'tazilas; and in opposition to the extreme orthodox 
class, it made use of dialectical method for the 
defence of the authority of divine revelation as applied 
52 
to theological subjects. This school, maintains an 
intermediary position where there will be a peaceful 
co-existence between revelation and reason. But reve-
lation got higher status in comparism to reason. 
Mu^taziliam was an attempt to measure reality by reason 
alone; it implied the identity of the spheres of reli-
gion and philosophy, and strove to express faith in 
the form of concepts or terms of pure thought. Ash'^ arism 
applied its dialectical method to the defence of the 
53 
authority of Divine revelation. 
52. Sharif, op.cit, p. 220-
53. Iqbal, Muhammad, 
The development of Metaphysics in Persia, 
Lahore: Bezm-1 Iqbal, 1959, P. 54. 
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PHILOSOPHERS; 
The Philosophers (Falasifah^ singular Faylasuf ) 
form one of the four main schools of Muslim philosophy 
The word 'Fayl^auf'is an Arabic equivalent of the 
Greek word 'Philosopher*. The Arabic writers give 
this name to those thinkers who were inspired by 
Greek Philosophy or whose thought had a close affi-
54 
nity with Greek Philosophy. 
The school started with Arab Philosopher al-
Klndi ( 260 A.H./ 873 A.D. } and continued to flourish 
even after Ibn Rushd,{ 595 A.H./ 1198 A.D. ) , parti-
cularly in Iranian School of Hikmah, the most dis-
tinguished representative of which was Mu€€a Sadr ud-
Din Shirazi, popularly known as Mui€a Sadra. This 
school deserves special attention in the context of 
o^f present study, because some of its prominent re-
presentatives made significant contributions to epis-
temology. 
Although al-Kindi was the first Arab thinker 
of the Greek tradition, who highlighted the role of 
reason in human knowledge, he was a firm believer in 
the Prophetic revelation. As he says, 'By my life, 
the utterance of Muhammad the true, and the message 
that he delivered from Almighty God—that is all as-
certainable by intellectual processes, which are re-
jected by none but those deprived of the form of 
..{} 
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reason. Human sciences, al-Kindi says, are acquired 
by man through research, effort and industry. These 
sciences fall short in rank of the divine science 
( al^ilm-ilahl ) which is obtained without research, 
effort and industry, and in no time. This latter 
knowledge is the knowledge of the Prophets, a knowledge 
56 
bestowed by God, This is unlike the knowledge of 
57 
logic and mathematics. Thus, he made a distinction 
between revealed knowledge and acquired knowledge 
through human effort which includes the employment 
of both reason and sense-perception, 
Al-FarabI { d, 339 A.H./950 A.D.) is another 
most important figure among the Muslim Philosophers. 
Like al-KlndlT he gives due reverence to Prophethood 
and tries to conciliate reason and revelation. His 
theory of Prophethood may be considered to be one of 
the most significant attempts at the reconciliation 
of philosophy and religion. The distinction, he made, 
55, Al-Kindl's Ft Kamiya Kutub Aristutalls ed, 
Abu Rida, quoted A.J. Arberry's f^ evelation 
and reason in Islam,London, George Allen and 
Vnwin Ltd. 1957 P. 35 . 
56, Shar i f , G p . c i t . , P . 4 2 6 . 
57, I t a i d w P . 463, 
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between rational conception and sense-perception 
is that the former is a kind of intuition or inspi-
ration or in other words, it is a kind of immediate 
apprehension. This is the noblest level of human 
apprehension, and it is reached only by the few and 
the select who attain to the level of the acquired 
intellect, where the hidden is unveilded, and come 
in direct communion with the world of separate intel-
58 
ligences. 
Thus, intellect is capable of rising gradually 
from intellect in potency to intellect in action,and 
finally to the level of acquired intellect. While 
intellect in potency is merely a receiver of sensible 
forms, intellect in action retains the intelligibles 
and comprehends the concepts. The acquired intellect 
rises to the level of communion ecstasy, and inspira-
59 
tion. Communion with the agent intelligence is 
possible through two ways: contemplation and inspira-
tion. The soul rises through stuay and quest to the 
level of the acquired intellect when it becomes the 
58, Al-Farabi's,Atb-Thamarat al-MarqJiyyah and 
al-Madinat al-Fa(jilah, c#, Sharif's A History 
Muslim Philosophy, Vol, I,P, 461. 
59. Ibid., PP . 461-62 
recipient of the divine light. This level can be 
achieved only by the sacred spirits of the philoso-
phers and sages, who can penetrate through the unseen 
and perceive the "World of light". The sacred soul, 
preoccupied with what is above, gives no heed to what 
is below and its external sensation never cieerwhelms 
its internal sensation. It receives knowledge direct 
from the High Spirit and angels without any human 
60 
instruction. Thus, through continuous speculative 
studies, the sage gets into communion with the agent 
intelligence, 
Al-FarabI maintains that the chief characteristic 
of a Prophet is to have a vivid imagination through which 
he can commune with the agent intelligence during waking 
time and in sleep, and can attain vision and inspiration. 
And revelation is but an emanation from God through the 
agent intelligence. Some persons, although in a lower 
degree than the Prophets, have a powerful insight through 
which an inferior kind of vision and inspiration can be 
61 
achieved. In this way, al-Farabl considers the rank 
of saints a degree lower than that of Prophets. Thus, he 
makes an attempt to explain prophecy on rational grounds 
and gives it. a scientific interpretation. 
60, Ibid., P. 463. 
61. Ibid,, P. 465. 
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Ibn Miskawaih ( d. 421 A.H,/1030 A.D.) is 
another pre-Ghazalian Muslim Philosopher who has made 
significant contribution to epistemology as well as 
to other branches of philosophy. According to him, 
all human knowledge begins from sensations which are 
gradually transformed into perceptions. The earlier 
stages of intellection are completely conditioned by 
the presence of external reality. But the progress of 
knowledge means to be able to think without being con-
ditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its 
object is to gradually free itself from the primary con-
62 
dition of its own possibility. In the formation of 
concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point 
of freedom from materiality. Concept being the result 
of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot be 
regarded as having completely freed itself from the 
gross cause of sensations; nevertheless, the fact that 
conception is based on perception, should not lead us 
to ignore the great difference between the nature of 
the concept and percept. The individual (percept ) 
is a constantly subject to change. The knowledge of 
62. Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia,p.25? 
.. Cf. Ansari, M. Abdul Haq, The Ethical philosopv 
of Miskawaih Aligarh: Muslim University 
Pr'^ ss, 1964, P. 63. 
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individuals, therefore, lacks the element of per-
formance. The universal ( concept), on the other-
hand, is not affected by the law of change. Indi-
viduals change, the universal remains intact. It 
is tne essence of matter to submit to the law of 
change; the freer a thing is from matter, the less 
is liable to change, God, therefore, being absolu-
tely free from matter is absolutely changeless; and 
it is His complete freedom from materiality that 
63 
makes our conception of Him difficult or impossible, 
Ibn Sina ( d. 428 A.H./1037 A,D.) is the 
only one among the great Muslim philosophers to build 
an elaborate and complete system of philosophy, a 
system which has been dominent in the Muslim Philoso-
phical tradition for centuries. His theory of know-
ledge is considered to be a significant contribution 
to Muslim Philosophy. In accordance with the universal 
Greek tradition, ibn Sina considers all knowledge as 
some sort of abstraction on the part of the cognizant 
of the form of the thing known. About sense-perception 
his view is that, it needs the very presence of matter 
for its cognitive act; imagination is free from the 
63, Ibid,, PP. 25-26 -
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presence of actual matter but cannot cognize without 
material attachments and incidents which give to the 
image of its particularity, whereas in intellect alone 
64 
the pure form is cognized in its universality. 
Ibn -^ Ina was the believer in divine revelation, 
sought to establish it at four levels: the "intellec-
tual", the "imaginative", the "miraculous", and the 
"socio-political". The totalit;^f the four levels 
evinces a clear indication of religious motivation, 
character, and direction of his thinking. In his doc-
trine of prophecy he drastically modifies the Muslim 
dogmatic theology by declaring that the Qur'anic reve-
lation is, by and Idrge, if not all, symbolic of truth, 
not the literal truth, but that it must remain the 
65 
literal truth for the masses. The revelations con-
tained in the religious scriptures are, for the most 
part in figuratdjan order and must, therefore, be inter-
preted in order to elicit the higher, underlying, 9 
spiritual truth. 
Thus, Ibn Sina makes an attempt to elucidate 
the perceptual knowledge and its different phases of 
development. He tries to establish divine revelation 
64. Sharif, Op.cit., PP. 492-93-
65. Ibid., P. 498- Cf. Arberry, Op.Cit. PP.48-49 
66. Ibid., P. 500- ' •' 
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on rational foundation and, thereby, endeavours to 
reconcile the spirit of reason and revelation, 
SUFISM 
Sufisim (Tasawwuf-Islamic Mysticism) comes among 
the four main schools of Muslim Philosophy, The main 
aim of Sufis is to attain the nearness of God-to 
apprehend Divine Reality. Sufis have got some signi-
ficant views concerning the theory of knowledge, 
before al-Ghazall we see some of the great sufIs who, 
apart from their spiritual practices and scrupulously 
led life, have made some contribution to epistemology, 
Sufism- an appeal to a higher source knowledge which 
was first systematised by Dhu'n-Nun al-'^ ^^ isri ( 245 A.H,/ 
859 A.D.), and became more and more antischolastic in 
67 
contrast to dry intellectualism of the Ash^ariyas. He 
took a very significant step in the development of 
Sufism by distinguishing the mystic's knowledge of 
God ( Ma^rifah) from traditional and intellectual 
knowledge and by connecting the former with love (^ ishq ). 
He says: 
67, Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, 
P. 46, 
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"True knowledge of God, is not the 
knowledge that God is One, which 
is possessed by all believers;nor 
the knowledge of Him derived from 
proof and demonstration, which 
belongs to philosophers, rhetorians, 
and theologians; but it is the know-
ledge of the attributes of Divine 
Unity, which belongs to the saints 
of God, those who behold God with 
hearts in such wise thatj/f-eveals unto :1\ 
them what ^ e reveleth not unto any 
one else in the world, 68 
Al-WuhasibI ( d. 243 A.H./867 A.D. ) is among 
the earliest sufi writers who makes a distinction 
« 
between the knowledge which can be acquired by study 
( ^Ilm ) and intuitive understanding (Mafrifah) which 
is given , not acquired, by means of which man can 
learn to know himself and his Lord and the true worth 
69 
of this world in comparison with the word to come, 
Junaid of Baghdad ( d. 298 A,H./ 910 A.D. ) has too, 
made a distinction between extoric and esotoric know-
ledge. He expresses his indebtedness to ^All ibn '^ ^^  
Talib for his mystic knowledge, for ^Ali, according to 
him, possessed an abundance of both extoric and estotoric 
70 
knowledge. Although al-Hallaj ( d.309 A.H./922 A.D.) 
68. •^ Attar, Farid ad-Din, Ta(;li3kirat al-Awliyi, cf, 
by Nicholson, R.A., The Idea of Personality in 
Sufism, Delhi: Idarah-i-Adabiyat-i-Delli, 
reprint, 1976, PP. 9-10. 
69. Smith, Margaret, Al-Ghazall the Mystic, London; 
LUzac 6. Co. 1944, P, 124. 
70. Sharif/ Qp,cit., 344. 
accepts reason as the source of knowledge, he could 
not, like the other Muslim Mystics, fully satisfy 
with the reasoned demonstration. Sure and certain 
71 
knowledge, to him, comes from God through inspiration. 
Another important sufI writer is Abu Talib al-
Makki { d.386 A.H./ 996 A.D.) , v/ho has made a signi-
ficant contribution to Islamic epistemology. He dis-
tinguishes between outward ^knowledge ( ^ ilm az-Zahir) 
and inward knowledge ( ^ ilm al-batin): the former 
concerned with this world ( al-Mulk ) and latter with 
the world to come ( al-Malakut), and the inner knowledge, 
• I I r I . . I I I I ^ 
he maintains, is superior to the outward as the invisible 
72 
world to the visible. 
Al-Qushairi ( d.465 A.H./ 1072 A.D. ) was one of 
the greatest sufI writers who had written on different 
aspects of Suflsm. He also, like some of his sufl pre-
decessors, made a distinction between 'gnosis'(^Irfan ) 
and 'knowledge'. Gnosis is achieved by one who has 
knowledge of the Real in all the various aspects and 
then carries out his dealings with everyBody within the 
constant framework of reference to God, gets rid of his 
own base features and does not permit even a single 
71. Arberry, Op.cit., 29* 
72. Al-Makki, Abu-Talib, Qut al -QuEub , Cairo,A.H.1351 
vol. 1 P. 197; Cf. Smith, Margaret, Op.cit-.p.l28> 
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thought to enter his mind which attracts him to any-
thing but God. He who has achieved all this is known 
as a gnostic ( ^ arif ) and his state is known as that 
of gnosis ( Ma^rifah ), 
Another noted pre-Ghazalian sufI is al-HujwIrl 
(d.c. 4 56/ 1063 A.D.) who like al-Qushairl highlights 
the basic distinction between gnosis and knowledge. 
Knowledge, to him, is that which in the last resot>, 
when analyzed, never takes us beyond empty verbal fonn; 
gnosis on the other hand, is that awareness which,when, 
analyzed, ends up in direct experience of concrete 
facts, processes and things. Knowledge, therefore, 
seldom influences one's real conduct, while gnosis can 
74 
seldom remain without influencing it. 
Now, we have got a brief account of the episte-
mological position of the pre-Ghazalian Sufis who 
have made a significant contribution to Islamic epis-
tomology. Thus, we have found a brief outline iof the 
epistemological views of the four main schools of Muslim 
philosophy Mu^tazillah, Ash'riah, Philosophers and 
Sufis, But : our account of the pre-Ghazalian Muslim 
epistemology would be incomplete if we do not include 
another school i,e,, Ikbwan as-safa, 
73. Sharif, Op.clt., p. 332' 
74. Ibid., P. 331. 
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The group of the Ikhwan as-safa ( originated 
about 373 A.H./ 983 A.D.) made a remarkable contri-
bution to the different branches of Muslim Philosophy. 
They possessed a great interest in epistemology. 
They accept the role of the five senses in the acquisi-
75 
tion of knowledge. But through our senses we acquire 
only the material changes immediately apprehended by 
us and occurring in space and time. They view that man 
acquires knowledge also by means of primary reason. 
But reason, if unaided by sound senses, cannot acquire 
knowledge. Moreover, concepts having no connection 
without senses, like those of God and the First Matter 
cannot be acquired thus. Akin to the two previous ways 
is the way of proof, the way of the trained dialecti-
cians. 
The object of the present study is to make a 
critical assessment of al-Ghazali's epistemology, A 
number of research works have been done on different 
aspect^of al-Ghazalia's philosophy. But his episte-
mology, which is a one of his significant contributions 
to philosophy, has hitherto been ignored. Much has 
been written on the life and works of al-GhazalI( b. 450 
A.H./1050 A.D.; d. 505 A.H. /Ull A.D. ) So here, we 
shall not give any biographical sketch of his. 
75. Ibid. 192. 
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Apart from the intro-Suction, this dissertation 
would consist of five chapters. 
In the first chapter we shall give a general 
account of epistemology which may work as a paradigm 
to our present study. In this chapter, the require-
ments, the sources, the nature and the validity of 
knowledge in the light of modern epistemology will be 
dealt with. In the second chapter, we shall deal with 
al-Ghazali's view of knowledge and its sources. We 
shall explain Ghazalian notion of the nature of know-
ledge in the third chapter. The fourth chapter will 
deal with al-Ghazall's outlook on the validity of know-
ledge. In the fifth and last chapter, we shall make 
an attempt to examine and evaluate al-Ghazall's epis-
temology as a whole. 
C H A P T E R - I 
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EPISTEMOLOGY: A GENERAL ACCOUNT 
Before going to a general account of epistemology, 
i.e., theory of knowledge, it would be pertinent to give 
a brief account of what a philosopher means by knowledge 
and under which condition something can be considered as 
knowledge. 
It has been commonly accepted, although Edmund 
1 
Gettler differs, that knowledge requires three basic 
conditions. Philosophers commonly call them; the truth 
condition, the belief condition and the justification 
2 
condition. Any standard analysis of Person S's knowing 
P, as having a form similar to the following analysis: 
S knows P, if and only if 
(i) P is true 
(ii) S believes that P, and 
3 
(iii) S is justified in believing P. 
1. Gettier, Edmund, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge'? 
Analysis 23: 121-123. Reprinted in Roth andGalis,1970 
He considers that these three conditions are insuffi-
cient for knowing something. But he does not provide 
the substitute conditions for this. Our concern here 
is not to go in detail on this very issue. 
2. Shope, Report K. 
The Analysis of Knowingf Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983, P. 3* 
3. Loc.cit. 
3d 
Such an analysis treats conditions (i), (ii) and 
(iii) as individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
for S's knowing P. In the first case P must be true, 
otherwise no knowledge of P is possible. In the second 
case, P is believed to be true. There may be all sorts 
of true statements, but if one does not believe them, 
he can hardly say that he knov/s them. In the middle 
ages very few people would say that the earth was round 
and they did not know that it was - not because the 
statement 'the earth is round' was not true but because 
they did not believe, it was. Philosophers then put 
forward the last point that the former two conditions, 
i.e., truth and belief conditions, are not sufficient 
for knowing. The knower should be justified in believing 
4 
that known object. 
Now, we may turn to the subject matteri of epis-
temology which consists of the sources, nature and vali-
dity of knowledge. 
SECTION: 1 , THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE 
In connection with the sources of knowledge phi-
losophers have different opinions. Some put stress on 
reason, while others on experience, i.e. sense-perception, 
4. Edwards, Paul, The Encyclopedia of Philosonhv 
New York: The Macmillan Co.Sc the Free'Press 1967-
Vol. IV P. 346' 
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and still others on intuition. Some other thinkers 
seek the synthesis of reason and sense-perception in 
the aquisition of knowledge. To some others, testimony 
or authority is the source of knowledge. Let us see 
how these have been presented by their defenders and 
what role they played in determination of different 
philosophical systems, 
REASON; 
The English word 'reason' has a large nvunber 
and wide variety of senses and uses, related to one 
another in ways that are often complicated. Here, we 
shall use 'reason' in its epistemological sense, i.e., 
as a source of knowledge. Here, reason stands in con-
trast to experience. In this context, what can be 
achieved by reason is, roughly, what we can discover 
or establish by merely sitting and thinking. 
The thinkers who stress on reasoning as the 
central factor in knowledge are known as rationalists. 
Rationalism is based on the\iriew that we know what we 
have thought out, that the mind has the ability to dis-
cover truth by itself, or that knowledge is obtained by 
5 
comparing ideas with ideas. The term 'rationalism' 
5. Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy,P. 41. 
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( from the Latin 'ratio'"reason") has been used to 
refer to several different outlooks and movements of 
ideas. By far, the most important of these is the 
philosophical outlook or programme which stresses the 
power of a priori reason to grasp substantial truths 
about the World and, correspondingly, tends to regard 
6 
natural science as a basically a priori enterprise. 
The rationalists in emphasizing man's power of 
thought and what the mind contributes .to it, are likely 
to assert that the senses by themselves, cannot give us 
coherent and universally valid judgements. The highest 
Xlnd of knowledge consists in the universally valid 
judgements that are consistent with one another. The 
sensations and experiences, we receive through the senses-
sight, sound^touch, taste and small- are just the materials 
of knowledge. These sensations have to be organized by 
the mind into a meaningful system before they become 
knowledge. The rationalists are of the opinion that 
knowledge is found in concepts, principles, and laws,not 
7 just m raw sensations. 
6. Wandelbaum, Maurice; Gramlich, Francis W., 
Anfilerson, Alan Rose, ed. 
Philosophic Problems; An Introductory Book of 
Readings, NewYork: The"Macmillan Company-l966,P.114. 
7. Titus, Living issues in Philosophy^ P. 41. 
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It is maintained that the most perfect form 
of knowing is the sort which is found in mathematical 
demonstration. Such demonstration consists in starting 
with premises which are self evident, intuitively cer-
tain, or are said to be clear and distinct, and dedu-
cing the consequences of these axioms and truths. 
By this method we can assume ourselves certainty 
in knowledge. The source of our first premises is the 
'natural light' of reason and our developed knowledge 
would have the validity characteristic of strict logical 
deduction. Just as this is true of mathematical know-
ledge, so can it, also, be true of our knowledge of the 
world. Among the prominent representatives of modern 
rationalism, we may mention the name of Descartes, Spinoza, 
Leibnitz^Fichte, Schelling., and Hegel. 
EXPERIENCE; 
As a plain man understands, the term"experience", 
means no more than familiarity with some matter of 
practical concern, based on repeated past aquaintance 
or performance. An experienced doctor or soldier knows 
his trade, not by the book merely, but by long practice 
under a variety of circumstances. But in epistemology, 
the term 'experience* has been used in a little bit 
different way. Here, a group of thinkers is found who 
* 1 " " J 
consider experience as the only authentic source of 
knowledge, and they are, accordingly, known as the 
empiricists. What we see, hear, touch, smell and 
taste - that is, our concrete experiences— consti-
tute the realm of knowledge. Empiricism puts stress 
upon man's power of perception, or obseirvation, or 
what the mind receives from the external world. Know-
ledge is obtained by forming ideas in accordance with 
the observed facts. Stated briefly, empiricism main-
tains that we know what we have found out from our 
8 
senses. 
The word 'empiricism* is derived from the Greek 
word 'emperia*, the Latin translation of which is 
'experientia', from which in turn we have derived the 
9 
word 'experience'. There may be several versions of 
empiricism. The weakest form of it is the doctrine 
that the senses do provide us with knowledge in some 
sense of the word. The weak form of empiricism can be 
generalized into the thesis that all knowledge comes 
from experience. The extreme form of this thesis would 
be to claim that no source other than experience pro-
10 
vides knowledge at all. 
8. Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy, P. 39-
9. Edwards, Paul, ed.The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Vol.2, Newyork, 1967, P.p. 499;^  ~~~ 
10. Ibid., p. 499. 
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The prominent Representatives of empiricism are: 
Epicurus in the ancient period^ St. Thomas Aquinas in 
medieval period, and the British empiricists, Locke, 
Barkeley and Hume in the modern period. The British 
empiricists claim experience as the only source of 
knowledge. But the techniques they adopt in order to 
establish their views, are not uniform. 
INTUITION; 
The term 'intuition' (intueri, to look upon) 
symbolizes the conception that one among the sources 
of knowledge is the direct and immediate apprehension 
11 
of truth. It does not accept the notion that all 
wisdom is based on, whether directly or indirectly, 
upon intellectual processes and reasoned judgements. 
A possible source of knowledge is intuition, or the 
direct apprehension of knowledge. In the literature 
dealing with intuition,one comes across such expres-
sions as 'immediate feeling of certainty,'imagination 
touched with conviction', a 'total response' to some 
'total situation' and a 'direct insight into the truth 
11. ^4andelbaum, 
Gramlich 
Anderson, Op.cit., P. 115. 
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Different explanations are found regarding 
intuition. There is an element of intuition present 
in all knowledge, Henry Bergson, considers intuition 
as a higher kind of knowledge different in nature 
1 2 
from that disclosed by the senses or intellect. 
Intuition, according to mystics, may enable us to 
gain a vision of reality, to receive the inspirations 
13 
from God, or to experience a union with God, In 
mysticism, it is claimed that truth can be attained 
by supra-rational and supra-sensuous faculty of 
intuition. Followers of all the great religions have 
declared that their leaders gained a unique insight 
into religious and moral truths through intuition. 
SYNTHESIS OF REASON AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE; 
In the history of Western Philosophy, perhaps 
Kant is the first who attempts to give a synthetic 
explanation of knowledge. He tries to show that know-
ledge is the joint product of both reason and sense-
experience. Kant maintains that knowledge cannot con-
sist exclusively in the receiving of sense-impressions 
as pleaded by Hume. A judgement that merely reports 
12. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 29l» 
13. Gould, Jame A.^ ed. Classic Philosophical Questions 
Fourth edition, Columbus: Charles E.Merrill ~ 
Publishing Co. 1982, p. 239» 
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about sense impressions as we receive in our day 
to day life can never be universally valid and 
necessarily true, 
Kant maintains that all knowledge begins with 
experience but it does not arise, necessarily, out 
of it. He is of the opinion that there are two 
apriori forms of sensibility ~ space and time. All 
objects of perception are necessarily located in 
space-time framework. Kant also holds that all empi-
rical knowledge is the product of human understanding 
which organizes the contents of sense-experience and, 
also, meaningfully categorises them. These princi-
ples are termed by Kant as the categories of under-
standing. They are not product of experience but the 
ground of all empirical knowledge. He also points 
out that the employment of a priori and pure catego-
ries of understanding independent of the data supplied 
by experience is illegitimate. Thus, Kant has made 
an attempt to synthesize the role of reason and sense-
14 
experience in acquisition of knowledge. 
14. Cf. Kant, Imrnanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, 
Tr. into Eng, by F. Max, Muller, Sec.ed, 
New ^ork: The MacMillan Company, 1922,PP,105-6. 
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AUTHORITY AND TESTEMONY: 
Authoritarianism is an epistemological doctrine 
ac ording to which knowledge is guaranteed or vali-
dated by an authority. In authoritarianism, the 
scope of critical and independent inquiry ceases 
regardless of its form. Authority or testemony is 
accepted on blind faith and, it is ignored whether 
its claim does or does not harmonize with experience. 
As a classic illustration of authoritarianism 
we may cite the Scholastic thinkers of the Middle 
ages who dared not to deviate from the teaching of 
the Church, In Indian Philosophy, the place of autho-
rity or testemony as the source of knowledge is well-
founded. Sankara accepts .Agama or scriptural teste-
15 
mony as an independent source of knowledge. Madhava, 
another noted thinker of India too, has accepted 
testemony as the source of knowledge. He accepts the 
16 
authority of theVedas as a whole. In Muslim philosophy^ 
the authority of the Qur'an and the. Traditions of the 
Prophet(s) has a great importance as the source of 
knowledge, particularly religious knowledge. In every 
15. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy,New Delhi,Bombay, 
Calcutta, Madras, Blackie Son Publishers, 1983^  
P. 494* 
16. Ibid., P. 739. 
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religion, the respective scripture is accepted as 
the authority and the informations it contains have 
been accepted without any serious critical judgement. 
SECTION II THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 
The second important question discussed in 
epistemology pertains to the nature of knowledge. The 
Chief Philosophic question that crops up in such an 
issue is that of appearance versus reality; whether 
or not the object apprehended can retain its existence 
and character apart from its relation to the apprehen-
ding subject. Dealing with this problem, philosophers 
have different views, which are as follow : 
THE COMMON-SENSE VIEW 
An ordinary man who has not reflected very much 
about the problem of perception and the physical world, 
may be termed as a 'realist' in the broad sense of 
the term. This view is usually held as the common-
sense view of the world. According to this, the dis-
tinctions between thoughts and things, past and present, 
and absent, Knower and object known are comparatively 
fixed and are common to all spectators. Things we 
come across in our day-to-day life, exist in their 
own right quite inedependently of our perceiving and 
'it} 
17 
thinking about them. This doctrine is called 'naive 
realism'. We may be aware of the things of the world 
when we come in contaat with them though through the 
senses. 
SUBJECTIVISM 
The other name of subjectivism is 'epistemolo-
gical idealism'. It is that theory of epistemology, 
according to which, the objects wr the qualities of 
the world which are perceived by the senses, do not 
exist independently of a consciousness of them. The 
external world is, in kind, like the mind, so that 
reality consists of a conscious being, and also its 
states, though not necessarily the conscious being and 
states of his mind. 
Historically, this position is represented best 
by the philosopher, George Berkeley. His most famous 
statement is: 'To be is to be perceived'. He begins 
with the philosophy of John Locke who divides the 
qualities of material substance into primary qualities-
form, extension, sol»idity, motion, number and so on -
and the secondary qualities- colour, sound, taste. Odour •-and 
17. Montague, vi», Pepperell - The ways of Knowing, 
London: George Allan & Unwin.Ltd., 1925,p. 240-
SO on. The primary qualities of an object are those 
that (qualities which) exist independently of any 
perception. But the secondary qualities are not 
really the qualities of the object of the external 
world; they vary from person to person, and are, 
18 
therefore, in the mind. Berkeley, however;, claims 
that the same argument can also be applied to the 
primary and secondary qualities as 'ideas' and con-
cluded that material object is simply a collection 
19 
of ideas, 
OBJECTIVISM 
The objectivists or the epistemological realists 
reject the view of Berkeley, that is 'to exist is to be 
a mind or an idea in some mind'. They uphold the exis-
tence of an external world independent of the mind. 
The naive realists, as we have already come across, 
contend that we perceive the physical object itself. 
In Lock's version of realism, which is termed as 'copy 
theory' or 'representative realism', it is maintained 
that the primary qualities are in the ourter world,but 
18. Titus,Harold H.,Living Issues in Philosophy,P.58* 
19. Titus, Harold H,& Hepp ,NayIon H.The Range of 
Philosophy; Introductory Readings, Sec.Ed.NewYork: 
Van Nostrand Reinhold Company,1970,P. 29(taken from 
George Berkeley's, A Treatise Concerning the Principles 
of Human Knowledge, 1710), 
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the secondary qualities are in the mind. The mind 
knows the copies or images of the external things. 
The critical realists of the twentieth century would 
claim that what we perceive is not an ,object but what 
20 
is called 'sense-data*. To them, our knowledge of 
the physical object is not direct knowledge. It is 
obtained through •acquaintance with the sense-data that 
21 
make up the appearance of the physical object, 
INTERMEDIARY POSITIONS 
Some writers point out that between subjectivism 
and objectivism, there is a position known as 'pheno-
menalism* or 'epistemological dualism'* The best repre-
sentative of phenomenalism is Kant, according to whom 
phenomena only can be known; we cannot know the ultimate 
reality. Kant divides the world into three parts, as 
an attempt to answer the question what we can know. 
These three are: an inner world of subjective states 
(i.e. images, sensations and the like), which is not 
the realm of knowledge; the world of ultimate reality 
( noumenon or thing-in-itself ), which is unknown and 
unknowable by sense-perception; and the world of nature 
20. Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, 
Oxford University Press- 1980, P. 25 • 
21. Ibid, PP. 25-26-
^ b 
or of experience, the phenomenal realm which is the 
realm of human knowledge. The mind is active, and 
it forms a system of knowledge out of all the mate-
rials brought in by the senses. This notion of Kant 
has been termed differently. According to some, it 
is 'phenomenalistic realism'/ to some others, 'Kantian 
idealism', and another group terms it just as 
22 
'phenomenalism' . 
The contemporary school of critical realism 
is also called epistemological dualism, for this 
school holds that external objects are known through 
the mediation of sense-data, which is not identical 
with the physical object. Opposed to this school is 
Neo-realism that is called 'Epis(temological monism', 
as it regards sense-data identical with the object 
SECTION III - THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
The validity of knowledge is one of the three 
main problems of epistemology. A question may arise: 
Whether the human mind is capable of acquiring genuine 
knowledge? In other words, knowledge which is valid? 
Why are some beliefs considered to be true and others 
22. Titus, Living Issues in Philosopy,P.59 • 
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false? The answer to these questions had been sought 
by the Greek philosophers, such as, Socrates, Plato 
and others. Men are still seeking the answer. Through-
out the ages, opinions and beliefs have tended to 
change - not only the common everyday belief but,also, 
the beliefs held in the field of science and philo-
sophy. A great diversity of beliefs has been found 
among the philosophers of the past and of the present. 
In the field of epistemology, in order to determine 
the validity and the invalidity ( i.e. truth and falsity) 
of knowledge, philosophers have put forward three dif-
ferent theories, e.g. 'the correspondence theory of 
truth' 'the coherence theory of truth', and 'the prag-
23 
matic theory of truth'. 
THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY; 
The correspondence theory is the most widely 
accepted theory of truth to the realists. It claims 
that truth is 'fidelity to objective reality'. A 
statement is true if it describes the fact, or agrees 
24 
with the actual situation. Truth is an agreement bet-
ween the fact and the statement of the fact; or, bet-
ween the judgment and the environmental situation of 
which the judgement claims to be an interpretation. 
23. Ibid., P. 64-
24. Woozley, A.P.,Theory of Knowledge,Seventh Impression, 
London: Hutchinson University Library,1966,P.126* 
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Things by themselves are neither true nor false. 
They just are or are not. Truth has to do with 
the assertions or the claims that we make about 
things. 
The exponents of the correspondence theory 
of truth hold that the presence or absence of belief 
has no direct bearing on the issue of truth and false-
hood; because truth and falsehood depend on the con-
dition or set of conditions which has been affirmed 
or denied. A judgment is true if it does corresp)ond 
with the -.fact, and, false, if it fails to correspond 
to it. 
THE CO.'iERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH 
The coherence theory of the test of truth 
places its trust in the consistency or harmony of all 
our judgments; because, to this, we cannot compare 
our ideas and judgements with the world as it is. The 
defenders of the 'coherence theory of truth' are, 
generally, the idealists, although it is not only 
confined to that school of thought. According to this 
theory, a judgment can be held to be true if it is 
consistent with the other judgements that have already 
been accepted orknown to be true. True judgements are 
;;j 
logically coherent with other relevant judgments. 
The coherence theory of truth, in its simplest^ 
demands an inner or formal consistency in the system 
under consideration, quite apart from any interpre-
25 
tation of the universe as a whole. 
The idealistic principle of consistency con-
siders truth as a reciprocally consistent system of 
propositions, each of which gets its truth from the 
whole system. 
The idealists add that ' it is the consistency 
of our human beliefs with that whole which makes them 
true. Thus, purely formal consistency is abandoned 
and coherence with reality is made the essence of 
truth. It is this aspect which justifies calling this 
26 
a 'metaphysical form of the coherence theory of truth'. 
THE PRAGMATIC THSORY- THE TEST OF UTILITY 
There is another group of philosophers who 
do not accept both correspondence theory and coherence 
theory as the successful theories of the test of truth. 
25. Cf. Titus & Hepp, Range of Philosophy,P. 38-
26. Robinson, Daniel S#. An Introduction to Living 
Philosophy, NewYork; Thomas, Y.Crowell Company, 
1932 PP. 104 - 105 . 
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To them, truth itself cannot correspond to reality 
since we know our experience only. On the other hand, 
the coherence theory is formal. The exponents of 
this theory do not have any concern about substance 
and essences. In their interpretation of the flux of 
experience, the pragmatists are thoroughgoing empiri-
cists. For them, the test of truth is utility, worka-
27 
bility/or satisfactory consequences. 
The supporters of this approach to truth do 
not accept anything as static or absolute truth. The 
main exponents of this approach are John Dewey and 
William James, In their writings they have tried to 
explain the nature of truth. To them, an idea or a 
theory or a hypothesis is true if it works out in 
practice, or if it leads to satisfactory result. 
THE PROBLEM OF ERROR 
The problem of the validity of knowledge gives 
rise to the possibility of error. The problem of error 
also forms an important part of epistemology. In Greek 
philosophy Parmenides seems to have paid some attention 
to this problem. Plato dealt with this problem in details. 
27. James, William, Pragmatism, Newyork and London, 
1907- PP. 216-217. 
28. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3, P. 46. 
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In contemporary philosophy, this problem has been 
discussed by different philosophers, particularly 
by neo-realists and critical realists. 
A detailed account of the neo-realistic theory 
of error is found in the writings of W.P. Montague and 
E,B. Holt. The position they hold is not uniform. 
Holt suggests that error of any kind does not prove 
the existence of any subjective inference nor even much 
of physiological distortion. Contradictory facts and 
laws exist in the objective world that result in error. 
In case two contradictory things are perceived, though 
both are not real, both of them are objective. To be 
objective and to be real are not same thing. Similarly, 
30 
to be false does not mean to be subjective. Elucidating 
various kinds of error Holt concludes that error is not 
subjective. 
Montague differs with the view of Holt in con-
nection with his theory of consciousness and that.'"of 
error. Holt's view that "contradictions are objective 
and related after the manner of opposing forces" is 
rejected by Montague. He maintains that the unreal 
29. Datta, D.M. 
The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy 
Third edition, Calcutta; The University of 
Calcutta 1970,P. 330; Cf. John Passmore, A_ 
Hundred Years of Philosophy, England, Penguin 
Books, 1972,P. 263. 
30. Ibid., P. 331. 
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object or content of an error subsists extramentally 
but it does n<bt contribute any casual manner to its 
being afprehended. It can be known but it itself 
31 
does not have the status to be known. The attempt 
is made by Montague to explain error realistically 
without being influenced by any subjective or ideal 
interference. So, according to Montague. 'The source 
of error is due to the plurality of causes and coun-
32 
teraction of effects". 
Critical realists' treatment of the problem 
of error is different from that of neo-realists'. 
According to the former group, two reasons are mainly 
responsible for the neo-realists' failure to explain 
error; their monistic identification of content with 
object, and their attempt to deny the subjective, fhe 
monistic stand is objected on the ground that it is 
unable to explain how a memory image of a past object 
can be considered to be identical with the present one. 
Knowledge can:::not be merely explained in terms of 
physical causation or physiological reproduction. The 
denialof subjective element is unacceptable. Know-
ledge contains the factor of belief which is irredu-
33 
cible to objective terms. 
31. Ibid.,P.333» 
32. Ibid.,PP.334, quoted from TheNew Realism(ed.1922)p,298' 
33. Ibid.,P.356. 
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VJhen we claim to know something, we assign a 
certain 'essence'- Character or group of characters, 
- to some reality existing independently of the know-
wledge process. Truth being an identity of this 
essence with the actual character of the reality 
referred to, error would lack such an agreement, and 
ascribe such essence mistakenly to a wrong character 
34 
instead of a right one. 
Thus, epistemology is that branch of philosophy 
which looks into the problems concerning the sources, 
the nature and the validity of knowledge. Various 
epistemological theories have been put forward by the 
different philosophers from timetto time as just out-
lined above. Since our main concern is to study the 
epistemological position of al-Ghazall, we, now, turn 
our attention to analyze his views on the above men-
tioned main epistemological problems, namely, the 
sources, the nature and the validity of knov^ledge. 
34. Ibid., P. 354-
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THE GHAZALIAN ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE AND IT'S SOURCES 
In most of his writings al-Ghazall highlights 
the importance of knowledge. He tries to show that 
knowledge is essential for both worldly as well as 
religious affairs» He very often quotes the verses 
of the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet(s) 
in order to show the significance of knowledge. 
Before going to his theory of knowledge it would, 
perhaps, be proper to see what al-Ghazali does mean 
by knowledge. Let us quote a passage from his work 
in this connection: 
"To begin with, what I am looking for is know-
ledge of what things really are, so I must undoubtedly 
try to find what knowledge really is. It was plain 
to me that sure and certain knowledge is that knowledge 
in which the object is disclosed in such a fashion 
that no doubt remains along with it, that no possibi-
lity of error or illusion accompanies it, and that the 
mind cannot even entertain such a supposition. Certain 
knowledge must also be infallible; and this infalli-
bility or security from error is such that no attempt 
1)0 
to show the falsity of knowledge can occasion 
doubt or denial..." 
In the previous Chapter we have seen that 
knowledge, as it is generally held, requires the 
fulfilment of the three basic conditions. A per-
son's claim to know something can only then be 
considered knowledge when (1) what is known is to be 
true; (2) the knower must believe what he has known? 
and (3) the knower is justified in believing what he 
has known. Now, if we analyze the above quotation 
of al-Ghazall we see that it has a striking simi-
larity with the modern approach to knowledge which 
we have already mentioned. 
We may notice a resemblance between al-Ghazall* s 
statement / "sure and certain knowledge is that know-
ledge in which the object is disclosed in such a. 
fashion that no doubt remains along with it"; and 
the first requirement of knowledge in modern episte-
mology that "what is known is to be true". Here,al-
Ghazali tries to show that what is known is to be 
disclosed clearly, it should be free from any doubt 
1. Watt, W, Montgomery, 
Faith and Practice of al-Qliazall, Eng. tr. of 
al-Ghazall's al-Munguidll min a(g-palal, and 
Bidayat-al-Hidliya. London; George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd. 1953, PP. 21-22' 
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and it would not be accompanied by any error. Now, 
if we compare 'what is known is to be true' with 
the above analysis of al-Ghazali's statement, the 
Ohazalian position seems to be more stronger and 
rigid. Secondly, "that mind cannot even entertain 
such a supposition" means that the knower should 
not have any doubt of what he has known. This is 
also similar to the statement that "the knower 
believes that what he iias known". Thirdly, al-
Ghazall's notion that "certain knowledge must also 
be infallible, and this infallibility or security 
from error is such that no attempt to show the fal-
sity of knowledge can occasion doubt or denial', is 
similar, to a large extent, to the Justification con-
dition of knowledge of modern epistemology. 
From the above discussion it seems that there 
are similarities between the Ghazalian conditions 
of knowledge and the conditions of knowledge pres-
cribed by modern epistemology-*although al-Ghazall' s 
language is, to some extent, different, It may, 
perhaps,.not be a very strong claim that al-Ghazali's 
Gondirions are more accurate and-precise. 
1)7 
Al-G'nazali agrees with Abu Talib al-Makki's 
(d.996 A.K.) classification of knowledge into outward 
(^ilm-az-zahir ) and inward ( ^ ilm-al-batin ) ones. 
The former is concerned with the external world 
(^alam-al-mulk) and the latter with the world to come 
(^ alam al-malakut) . By 'mulk' al-Ghazill means the 
visible world perceived by the senses and by 'malakut' 
he means the invisible world which is perceived by 
the light of insight. The heart, the instrument of 
inner Knowledge, belongs to the 'world of malakut'; and 
the members, the instruments of outward knowledge and 
2 
their actions belong to the 'world of mulk'. Al-Ghazall 
is of the opinion that knowledge can also be divided 
into two parts ^ilm al-ma^amalahor the science of conduct 
and ^ilm al-maka^hafahor the intuitive knowledge of God, 
I^lm al-mu^amalahis simply the means of attaining the 
higher knowledge i,e. ^ilm al-mukashafah , ^Ilm al-mu*amalah 
3 
includes both theory and practice. 
2. Al-Ghazall, Abu Hamid, Ihya%lum id-Din, Cairo: 
1340 A.H, Vols. I, P. 107;III;_IV,P,216 Fatihat al-
^Ulum, Cairo,1322 A.H,P,40,Imli, Cairo,1322 A.H.P.216 
KishkStal-Anwir, Cairo, 1343 A.H,P. 122 Cf,Al-MakkI, 
Abu Talib, gut al-::;ul'ab, Cairo, 1351 A,H.Vols,, I.P., 200; 
II P.32,'III P.106. ~~~ 
3, Ihya', Vol. I , PP.18-19. 
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/^e may, now turn to al-Ghazill's view of 
the different sources of knowledge, and see how'far 
he recognizes their importance in the act of cog-
nition. 
SENSE-SXPERIENGE 
Let us see first what status al-Ghazall has 
given to sense-experience in the acquisition of 
knowledge. Al-Ghazali holds that man's information 
about the world is by means of perception, and every 
perception of the perceptibles is created so that 
thereby man may have some acqutlfntance with a world 
4 
(or sphere) from among existents. 
Al-Ghazall has named the material world as 
^alam al-matjsusat and the spiritual world as Cgjam 
al-malakut. In comparison to the spiritual world 
5 
the material world is very brief, small and limited. 
According to him, human soul has two doors for acqui-
ring knowledge. One opens towards the spiritual 
world which is 'the world of Angels and the^  Guarded 
Tablet' ( al-Lawft al-Mahfuz ) ; and another door opens 
• • 
4. Faith and Practice, P. 63. 
5. Al-Ghazall, Kimiya-ye-Sa^adat (Bengali translation 
by Nui-ur Rahman) Dhaka: Imdadia Library, 1976, P.52 • 
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towards the five senses and it is connected with 
6 
the /tlaterial world. The knowledge of the learned 
and the scientist comes out of that gate of the souls 
7 
which remains open to the fljaterial World, Here, al-
Ghazali wants to say that the informations of the 
scientists are gathered through the senses, and the 
learned men, also, make themselves enlightened with 
the help of sense-experience. 
Al-Ghazall has based his theory of knowledge 
upon ^aql (intellect). He ciaims that the word '^aql' 
can be used interchangeably in four distinct senses. 
Experience i.e., sense-perception, according to al-
Ghazali, is one of the aspects of the human intellect 
(^ aql) . He maintains that intellect has to perform 
8 
four distinct but interchangeable functions as men-
tioned below. 
6. Cf. Itiya'^ lum id-Din, English translation by 
Fazlur Karim, New Delhi: Kitab Bhaban, 1982, 
vol.- Ill, p. 25. 
7. Ibid., P. 26. 
8. Faris, Nabih Amin, The Book of Knowledge, Eng.tr, 
of the Kitab al-*^ ilm of al-Ghazali's Il}ya| 
Lahore: Sheikh Mohd. Ashraf, 1962,P, 226. 
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First, it is the quality which distinguishes man 
from other animals, and prepares him to understand 
and grasp theoretical science ( nazariyyah ), and 
master the abstract ( fikriyyah ) disciplines. 
Ghazall considers it as a light cast into the heart 
preparing it thereby to grasp things and understand 
9 
them. -^ iecondly, the word ' ^ aql' is applied to that 
knowledge which makes its appearance even in the 
infant who discerns the possibility of possible 
things ( Ja^ izat ) and the impossibility of impossible 
things ( musta^ illat ) , such as the knowledge that 
'two is greater than one' and that 'one individual 
cannot be in two different places at the same time'. 
In the third place, the word ^aql has been applied to 
that knowledge which is acquired through experience 
in the course of events. Thus, he who has been taught 
by experience and schooled by time is called intelli-
11 
gent ( ^ aqil) . In the fourth place, the word *^aql' 
is used when the power of instinct develops to such 
an extent that its owner will be able to tell what 
the end will be. This is also the distinctive power 
9. Loc-Cit. 
10. Ibid., 227. 
11. Loc.cit. 
fu. 
of human being which makes him different from other 
12 
animals. Al-Ghazall has grouped the four phases of 
intellect (^ql) into two! (1) native (bi-al-tab^)and 
13 
(2) acquired ( bi-al-iktisab). We have already seen 
that al-Ghazall has considered sense-experience as 
one aspect of the ^aql and, also, shown its link with 
the knowledge of the material world. Human soul 
acquires knowledge of the activities of the different 
things, their cnaracters and, also, their nature 
14 
through ttv senses. 
In other words,experience or sense-perception 
is nothing but the acquired intellect which provides 
knowledge of the material world. 
REASON; 
In our discussion on sense-experience we have 
seen that the word '^aql* has distinct meanings in al-
£hazali's theory of knowledge. Although the diffe-
rent meanings are interlinked, their scope and methods 
are different in acquisition of knowledge. In the 
first sense, it means the distinctive quality of human 
15 
being which makes him different from other animals. 
12. Ibid., PP.277-28-
13. Ibid., P. 226^ 
14. Kimjya-ye Sa^adat, beng. tr. Vol.. I, PP. 51-52 • 
15. Kitab al-*Tlm of Ihya (Emg.tr.) PP.226-27. 
H^ 
In the second sense, the word ^aql is applied to 
that knowledge which makes its appearance even in 
the infant who discerns the possibility the impossi-
16 ^ 
bility of things. It is ' axiomatic and is derived 
from the application and extent of' aql'. Here, 
al-Ghazali's use of the term ^aql seems to have 
some similarity with the Rationalists' use of the 
term 'reason' as source of knowledge. 
The term'^aql' as we have already seen, has 
distinct meanings in al-Ghazall's theory of know-
ledge. He has grouped them into two e.g. (1) native 
and (2) acquired. Reason falls in the former group. 
18 
It is inborn and innate. Sometimes al-Ghazali con-
siders it as natural knowledge. This preliminary 
knowledge is imprinted in a boy's mind in his earliest 
19 year. He does not know wherefrom this knowledge comes. 
Al-Ghazall considers that theoretical reason 
(al-*^ *3l an-na2;ari) is concerned with the understanding 
of the phenomenal and the spiritual realities. It 
16. Ibid., P. 227. 
17. Loc.cit. 
18. Cf. Ibid., 227-28 
19. Al-Ghazali's Ihya Eng. tr. vol. Ill ,P.18. 
__: , 
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apprehends, generalizes and forms concepts. It goes 
from the concrete to the abstj;;act, from the particular 
20 
to the general, from diversity to unity, Al-Ghazall 
considers reason as a strong power in human beings. 
He terms it as light (nur), Among many powers in a 
human being reason is the strongest. By reason, man 
can acquire such types of knowledge which cannot be 
21 
acquired through the senses. Thus, al-Ghazall wants 
to show that as the source of knowledge reason has the 
higher status in comparison to sense-perception. In 
many cases sense-perception cannot provide any know-
ledge, while reason is capable to provide such knowledge, 
SYNTHESIS OF REASON AND SENSE-PERCEPTION; 
Synthesis of reason and sense-perception plays 
a vital role in al-Ghazali's theory of knowledge. 
Although he has accepted, as we have already seen, 
independent roles of sense-perception and reason in 
the process of cognition; he emphasizes their synthesis 
also. He says that knowledge is implanted in the 
souls at their beginning ( i.e. when first created), 
with potentiality, like the seed in the earth and the 
pearl in the depths of the sea, or in the heart of 
20, Umaruddin, The Ethical Philosophy o f al-Gh^all 
Aligarh Muslim University,Aligarh 1962,P.66• 
21. Klmlyayt sa^adat - Beng. tr. Vol. 4 P. 432. 
mine; and study is just required to bring forth 
22 
that thing from potentiality to actuality. Al-
Ghazali wants to say that what potentially exists in 
human soul is not sufficient for knowledge; for 
bringing this potentiality into actuality the study 
of nature through sense reception is needed. He 
says that when the bodily powers prevail over the 
soul the learner needs more study, and mvast spend 
more time on it, and he must endure trouble and much 
23 
weariness in the search for fruit. 
But side by side he puts stress on the reflec-
tion of the receptive soul which gives proper shape 
to the informations gathered by the senses. When the 
light of reason prevails over the sensible qualities, 
the seeker with but little reflection, can dispense 
with much study, for the receptive soul, through a 
single hour's reflection, gains what the unreceptive 
24 
soul does not gain by a whole year of study. Study 
needs reflection also; for, man can neither learn all 
22. Al-Ghazall , Ar-Risalat al-Laduniyya, translated 
into English by Smith, Margaret, published in 
the 'Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great 
Britain and Ireland' for 1938, P. 361. 
23. Loc-cit. 
24. Ibid., PP. 361-62. 
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particulars and universals, nor all subjects of 
knowledge. But he learns something, and, through 
reflection, infers some other things from what he 
25 
has learnt, 
Al-Ghazali uses the word 'tafakkur' and by 
~ 26 
this he means 'to seek knowledge'. He observes that 
knowledge always could not be received by the senses. 
In fact, in most cases, we stand in need of the help 
27 
of inference and reasoning to cognize something. When 
cognitions are arranged in a special way, a new cog-
nition is the result. This new cognition joins with 
one of the earlier cognitions and gives rise to a 
aitill new cognition. Thus, the number of cognitions 
goes on increasing and knowledge is vastly increased 
28 
and 'tafakkur' makes a tremendous advance. Al-Ghazali 
says that sometimes, due to man's inability to syn-
thesize different cognitions, he cannot receive new 
29 
knowledge. 
Al-Ghazall is of the opinion that certain 
things are deduced from the inner consciousness through 
30 
which he considers i^-  the foundation of sciences. 
Universal principles of sciences and their axioms are 
not discovered or deduced from mere collections of 
3 5 . I b i d , , PP. 361-62,._ ~ ~ ~ 
26 . A l - G h a z a l l ' s K imlya ,Beng . t r . v o l . 4 p . 3o4. 
27. Loc-cit, ' 
28. Ihya; vol. IV,PP. 368-364. 
29. Ibid., j>. 394 
30. Ar-Kisalat al-Laduniyya Eng. tr, p. 362 
i;6 
data but also inference and comparison are required -to 
31 
be applied. Thus, al-Ghazall wants to establish 
his theory of knowledge concerning this world on the 
sense-
basis of a joint venture of/perception and reason. 
AUTHORITY 
Another significant source of knowledge in al-
Ghazali's epistemology is 'authority*, By this he 
means 'the authority of the Qur'an and the "fraditions 
of the Prophet(s)i He accepts the information found 
32 
in them without a serious rational inquiry. He 
suggests that the authority of the Qur'an, and the 
Traditions of the Prophet(s) has to be accepted without 
insisting on testing them by first-hand experience. 
Let us, quote a passage from al-Ghazali in which he 
defends his contention with the help of some illustra-
tions: 
"Suppose we imagine a man, mature and capable 
of reasoning, who has never before experienced illness, 
and then falls ill, whose father is a doctor, compasio-
nate and skilled in medicine, whose medical skill has 
always been known to his son. If his father makes up a 
31. Loc.cit. 
32, Faith and Practice, P. 83• 
87 
prescription and says to him: 'This will help you 
in your sickness and will heal you of your affliction', 
what will be his response? Even though the medicine 
is bitter and abominable in taste, will he accept it, 
or will he reject it, saying: 'I understand that 
this medicine can ensure a cure, but, I have not myself 
tested it by experience'? Would you not reckon him a 
fool if he did so? So also teaching which comes down 
on the authority of the Prophet and his successors is 
to be accepted even though its validity may not have 
been tested by the experience of those who receive it. 
And those reject it for a similar reason are but fools 
33 
who deprive themselves of guidance and help". 
In order to defend the authority of the Qur'an 
and the Traditions of the Prophet(s) al-Ghazall holds 
that those who find contradictions and incoherence in 
34 
them are themselves lacking in the required insight. 
If anyone understands what it is to be a Prophet, and 
devotes much time to the study of the Qur'an and the 
Traditions, he will arrive at necessary knowledge of 
the fact that Muhammad { May God bless and preserve him) 
33. Al-Ghazali, Al-Munqidh min. ad-Dalal Cairo , A.H, 
1304, P. 33 , Cf. also found in Smith, Margaret, 
Al-Ghazall The Wystic. pp.80-81' 
34. 3ng,tr.of Kitab alAlm of Ihya, P. 231' 
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IS m the highest grade of the Prophetic calling. 
And he would be convinced that what the Prophet(s) 
36 
said about the different aspects of life is true. 
Al-Ghazali considers a prophet to be physician 
of the diseases of hearts. One should trust the prophetic 
revelation, as blindman trust their guides, and an 
37 
anxious patient his sympathetic physician. He further 
contends that in the process of reaching necessary 
knowledge one has to believe in ths prophethood of 
the Prophet(s) and, also, to reflect on the Qur'an 
38 
and read the Traditions. 
Thus, we see that al-Ghazali has accepted the 
informations given in the Qur^ -an and the Traditions 
without any hesitation. Rather, he advises others to 
accept their authority. According to him, to believe 
in their teachings,and, also to follow them is the 
surest and the most secure way of success. Therefore, 
authority of the Qur'an and the Traditions of the 
Prophet(s) occupies an important status as the sources 
of knowledge in al-Ghazali's epistemology. 
35. Faith and Practice, P. 67. 
36. Loc.cit, 
37. Ibid,, P. 70-
38. Ibid., P. 83 . 
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REVELATION AND INTQITION 
(A) AL-GHAZALI'S DIVISION OF WORLDS ACCORDING 
TO DIFFERENT LEVELS OF KNOWLEDGE: 
Al-Ghazall forwards the concept of the three 
worlds, viz., ^alam al-fWulk or Sbaha'da ( material 
or phenomenal world), ^alam al malakut (spiritual, 
invisible world) and "^alam al-jabarut ( world of 
39 
mind, reason, will and power). From the view of 
worlds 
their cognition each of the three/ is distinct from 
others: 
( 1) The objects of the terrestial or phenomenal world 
can be perceived with the physical senses, 
(2) The spiritual or celestial world lies beyond 
the capacities of the senses which are unable to know 
it. It is necessary to develop the spiritual faculty 
for gaining some knowledge of this world, and 
(3) The intermediate world, the world of mind 
(jabarut), serves as a link between the above mentioned 
40 
two worlds. Al-Ghazall says that there are two kinds 
of the ey&-external and internal. The former belongs 
to one world, the World of Sense, and the latter belongs 
39. Ihya vol. Ill PP. 23-27. 
40. "uiriaruddin. Ethical Philosophy, PP.78-79, 
Of. ^mith, Margaret_, Al-Gbazall the Mystic 
London: Luzac & -'Co. 1944, P. 208-
0 
to the world of the realm celestial; while the former 
world is disclosed through the senses the latter is 
41 
revealed through revelation and intuition. 
The world of sense-perception attract a novice 
with all its temptations: At this stage one has to 
endeavour to purify himself from the defilement which 
the material attachments cause. Between this base 
world and the olivine world, there lies another world, 
that of jaburut, which al-Ghazali compares with a 
ship moving on the water; away from the land; neither 
it is moving unceasingly nor is it completely immobilic 
He who walks on the land is like one passing through 
the world of mulk and SJjahada, but when he is strong 
enough to sail on a ship, he has passed into the 
'world of jabarut', and when he reaches the stage of 
being able to walk upon the water, needing no ship, 
then he walks in the world of malakut without the fear 
42 
of being sunk. The world of jabarut , therefore, is 
an intermediate station on the way of his journey; he 
has left the land behind and ie £ree from the sensual 
41. Al-Ghazali*s, Mlabkat al-Anwar , Eng. tr. by W.H.T. 
Gairdner, Lahore, Sh. M. Ashraf, 1952,PP.93-94. 
42. Cf. Ihya'lV 206, P.216. 
fetters and self-centred life, but he has not yet 
attained to a life altogether dominated by the 
spirit. His inner eye is open and he sees the goal 
clearly and hastens towards it, but is not yet 
there. At this stage, al-Ghazali maintains, one 
is in the midst of good and evil; but one who wipes 
aut all the traces of evil removes darkness from 
his hearts, but his vision is still "somewhat dim" 
like a mirror is blurred as a result of moisture 
43 
caused by breathing upon it. The traveller does 
not stop here; he repents his sin, waits for Divine 
grace, sacrifices his will for the Vill of God; only 
then Divine knowledge springs from his soul, Al-
Ghazali adds that this attainment exclusively depends 
44 
on the Divine Will, Al-Ghazall's three-fold division 
of the worlds is based upon his epistemological view. 
These three worlds represent three distinct stages 
of cognition that differ from each other according to 
the source and nature of knowledge, 
Al-Ghazali distinguishes between the two facul-
ties of soul. One leading to the knowledge of the 
world of angels and theGuarded Tablet (Lawh ^1-Mahfuz) 
43. Cf. Ihya, Book iii , P. ii 
44, Al-Ghazali , Ar-Rawdat at-Talibin, Cairo 
A.H. 1344, P. 134. 
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and the other leading to the world of senses . About 
the knowledge of the spiritual world, al-Ghazali says, 
it is something different from what the scientists 
and the learned men acquire. The informations of the 
scientists and the learned men come through the five 
senses, whereas, the knowledge of the spiritual world 
can only be received by the prophets and the friends 
46 
of God, through, revelation and intuition. Al-Ghazall 
puts stress on spiritual knowledge which lies beyond 
the capacity of the sense-perception. We may quote 
an illustration in connection with the purity and high 
status of spiritual knowledge: 
"... A well has been dug underneath the ground. 
There are two ways of pouring water in it, one way is 
'through pipes or canals', and another way is to dig 
the well very deep, so that water may gush forth from 
its bottom. The second mode is better as water obtained 
in this way is more pure and lasting. Similarly, soul 
is like a welli knowledge is like water, and the five 
senses are like pipes or canals. Knowledge like water 
comes to the soul through the help of five organs like 
pipes or canals. If you wish to get pure knowledge, you 
45. Ihya'( Eng. tr.) Ill, P. 25^  
46. Ibid., P. 26 
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shall have to shut up the five senses as you shut 
up the pipes or canals to get pure water into the 
well and dig it very deep so that pure water may 
gush forth from the bottom. The filth in the 
bottom must be cleared to allow pure water to gush 
forth from the bottom. So also^ in order to get 
pure and unadulterated knowledge you shall have to 
47 
shut knowledge gained by the five senses..." 
(B) THE DIFFERENCE AND SIMILARITY BETWEEN REVELATION 
AND INTUITION: 
Al-Ghazali, as we have already seen, talks 
about various kinds of knowledge acquired through 
sense-perception^reason, the synthesis of reason 
and sense-perception; and authority. These are 
acquired through effort. He further adds that there 
are two other kinds of knowledge that are not acquired 
48 
through effort: the former is the knowledge of the 
learned men and the scientists; and the latter two 
kinds of knowledge belong to a prophet (jiabl) and a 
saint (wall), 
47, Ihya; Eng. tr, vol. Ill P. 24. 
48. Ibid., P. 21. 
I't 
Al-Ghazali shows the difference between the 
'prophetic knowledge' and 'knowledge of saints', 
and maintains that 'prophetic knowledge' comes 
through an angel who reveals it to the prophets' soul 
49 
(wahy). In connection with spiritual knowledge a 
prophet possesses the highest rank. All secrets 
50 
are disclosed to him without his efforts. Al-Ghazall 
is of the opinion that esoteric knowledge derived 
from revelation, is higher and more certain than 
the scientific knowledge which is acquired through 
intellectual process. Revealed knowledge is the 
51,... 
privilege of prophets. He further contenfls that God 
has kept the door of revelation closed since the 
time of the Prophet Wuhammad(s) who is the apostle 
of God and the last of the prophets. His knowledge 
is more perfect, nobler and greater only because it 
is the result of Divine teachings and he never busied 
52 
himself with human learning and teaching, Al-Ghazall 
seeks support for his contention from the Qur'an 
where God says: "One Mighty Power taught him". 
49. Loc.cit. 
50. Ibid., P.8; ef' ar~Risalat al-Ladunniyya,Eng. tr,P,363 
51. Ar-Risalat al~Laduniyya, Eng, tr. P. 364. 
52. Ibid.,PP. 364-33. 
53 
* Sura, Liii, 5 
i:\ 
Al~Ghazali explains in detail the origin 
and the process of revelation. It is better to 
quote him at some length to get an accurate idea 
of his notion of wa^y, 
"Divine revelation ( wa^y ) , means the 
knowledge acquired when the soul has perfected 
itself and the defilement of human nature passes 
away from it along with all the filthiness of greed 
and desire, and it is detached from the lusts of 
this world: its links with transient desires are 
severed and it turns towards its Creator and Master 
and takes hold u]-on the bounty of its Author and 
relies uc,on His grace and the outpouring of His light, 
Then God, the Most High, by His most excellent 
favour, welcomes that soul with full acceptance 
and looks upon it with (His) Divine regard, and He 
takes from it a tablet, and from Universal soul 
(an~/lfafs-al~Kulliyya) a pen which inscribes upon 
it all His knowledge. Then Universal Mind ( al-
^Aql al-Kulli ) becomes the teacher and the sancti-
fied soul the taught, ind all knowledge is acquired 
by thac soul and all images are impressed upon it 
53 
without study and reflection". 
54. Ar-Risalat al~Laduniyyah, Eng, tr. P. 363. 
76 
Al-Ghazall says that knowledge of prophets 
lies even beyond the reach of the angels. He 
refers to the story of Adam and the angels. For, 
they devoted all their lives to Divine Being and, 
by different means, acquired much knowledge until 
they became most learned of the creatures and the 
55 
most understanding of the created things. Adam, on 
the otherhand, was not learned because he had not 
studied and did not look to any teacher. So, the 
angels vied with one another in boasting, and"- ^ ere 
arrogant and magnified themselves, and they said: 
"V7e aing thy praises and we bless thy Name; and v;e 
knov; the real meaning of things". Then Adam returned 
to his Creator's door and having detached his heart 
from all created things, came to seek help from his 
Lord and He taught him the names { of all things ) , 
And God placed Adam in front of the angels and asked 
them to declare unto Him tne names, and their (angels) 
state was diminished in Adam's sight and their pride 
was broken and they were submerged in the sea of 
impcPtance. They said to God: "rfe have no knowledge 
but what Thou has taught us", and God said: 
55. Ibid., 404' 
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"0 Adam, tell them their names". Then Adam 
informed them concerning the hidden things and the 
57 
mysteries of the Divine command (al-Amr). Citing 
this Qur'anic story, al-Ghazali wants to show that 
the rank of prophets is not only higher than that 
of the learned men, the scientists and the saints, 
but also, that of angels. The Prophets are acquainted 
with so many secret things of the heaven and earth 
which are unknown to angels. 
The second type of divine teaching is,accor-
ding to al-Ghazali , intuition or inspiration (ilham). 
Intuition is the awakening by universal soul in the 
individual human soul in proportion to its purity 
58 
and receptivity, and the degree of its preparedness. 
Intuition, however, is inferior to revelation, for 
revelation is the clear manifestation of the Divine 
Command, while intuition is the hinting point thereat. 
The knowledge which is derived from revelation is 
called 'prophetic knowledge', and that which is derived 
from intuition is called 'knowledge from higher(source), 
56. Sura, ii, 33-
57. Op.cit., 364, Cf. Ibva.' iii, pp. 328, 329. 
"There are two woridr&jr> the world of amr and the 
Created world every being devoid of quantity 
and dimension belongs to the World of amr; and iv, 
p. 23; "The word of amr is what prevails over the 
treated world". 
58. Ar-Risalat al-Laduniyya Eng. tr. P. 365» 
7 J 
(^ ilm al-laduniyya ). It is that knowledge which 
is attained without mediation between the soul and 
its Creator; it is, indeed, like radiance from the 
Lamp of the Invisible, shed upon a heart which is 
pure, at leisure, and subtle. That is because all 
knowledge is attained and known in the substance 
of the Primal Universal Soul, (which is present in 
incorporeal, primal, pure substances), through its 
relationship to the First intelligence (Universal 
59 
Mind.). 
Al-Gha^all makes a distinction between Universal 
Mind (al-^aql al-Kulli ) and Universal Soul ( an-
Nafs al-Kulll) in that while the former is nobler, 
more perfect, stronger and nearer to the Creator, 
the latter is nobler, more receptive and more honou-
. 60 _ _ 
rable than the rest of the creation, Al-Ghazall 
maintains that revelation is ensued from the out-
pouring of the Universal Mind; and from the radiation 
of Universal Soul comes intuition or inspiration. 
Now, revelation is the embfllishment of prophets while 
intuition is th^ornament of saints. But as regards 
59. Loc.cit. 
60. Ibid., PP. 365-66. 
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revealed knowledge, as the soul is below the intelli-
gence, and the saints below the prophets, so also 
is intuition below revelation, but stronger in 
comparison to vision ( ru'ya ), i.e,^  perceptual 
61 
knowledge, 
Al-Ghazali holds thac revealed knowledge belongs 
exclusively to apostles and ceased with them, but 
intuitive knowledge is possessed by both prophets 
62 
and saints. Thus, knowledge from on high belongs 
to prophets as well as saints. Al-Ghazall refers 
to the story of Khidr,for God said of him: "And We 
63 
have taugnt him knowledge from durself", Al-Ghazali 
talks about esoteric knowledge of ^All ibn-AbT-Talib, 
the fourth rightly guided Caliph of Islam, and quotes 
him as saying "The Apostle made his tongue enter my 
mouth and a thousand gates of knowledge were opened 
64 
unto me, and with each gate another thousand gates". 
The knowledge from on high, according to al-Ghazall, 
65 
cannot be received by study and deduction. To him, 
61. Ibid., P. 366-
62. Cf. Loc.cit..Cf. Itiya'. Eng.i'r.vol.1,P.62. 
63. Sura -XVIII, 65. 
64. Gp,cit, Pf. 366-67. 
65. Ibid,, 367. 
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the noblest and the highest of all sciences is to 
know God. This science is like a sea, the depth 
of which cannot be fathomed. In this science, the 
highest rank is that of the prophets, then that of 
66 
the saints, and finally those that follow. In 
order to attain the knowledge from on high, al-
Ghazali suggests that the souls have to be prepared 
and ready to receive it, and the meaning of the 
preparation is to remove the impurities that have 
67 
befallen them as a result of sins. Although al-
Ghazali stresses the significance of the purification 
of the heart for the attainment of Divine knowledge^ 
he does not assure that it would necessarily descend 
upon human soul. He holds that it exclusively depends 
on the Will of God. He says, "llham and wahy(ins-
piration and revelation) cannot be obtained by human 
will*God says: "It is not for a man to be with God 
except by means of wa^y or from behind the screens 
or by means of a messenger who reveals with His per-
68 
mission what He wishes", God has closed the door of 
revelation, whereby His servants were guided, and He 
has opened the door of intuition, out of His mercy, 
66 . Kitab al^Ilm of Ihya', Eng. tr. op,cit. P. 135* 
67v Cf. Ihya,Eng.tr.Book III, P. 8* 
68. -Ibid., P. 22. 
Hi 
and ordered affairs a right and placed souls in 
their different ranks, so that they may know that 
God shows loving kindness to His servants and He 
69 
gives sustenance to whom He wills, vjithout prices, 
(C) HUMAN SOUL AND ITS CAPABILITY TO ACQUIRE INTUITIVE 
KNOWLEDGE 
Knowledge is of many types, some of which 
have already been discusse<3. But in the acquisition 
of every kind of knowledge, al-Ghazall holds that 
human soul plays the main role. To him, soul is the 
tablet of knowledge; and its abode and place of habi-
tation, the body is not an abode for knowledge, for 
it is limited in its capacity to receive and contain 
many types of knowledge. It is capable of receiving 
only impressions and inscriptions, but the soul is 
able to receive all types of knowledge without test 
70 
or hindrance or fatigue or cessation. 
The nature of the soul, as al-GhazalT des-
cribes it, is substantial, simple, enlightened,com-
prehending, acting, moving, giving perfection to 
71 
instruments and bodies, Al-^hazali,further, adds that 
69. Cf. Ar,Risalat al-Laduniyya,Eng.Tr, P. 168 
^0' Ibid., P, 193* , , • . 
71. Loc.cit. 
H. 
the word 'qalb' has got two meanings. First, it 
is a piece of flesh in the left breast and is 
called the heart that is hollow in the interior -
the detailed description of which is found in 
anatomy. In the second sense qalb is that immaterial 
thing which is related to physiological heart, but 
at the same time receives knowledge of God and the 
72 
spiritual world. It is capable of both 'llm al~ 
mukashafah, spiritual knowledge, as well as 'llm-al-
73 
mu^amalah- the science of conduct. Al-Ghazall 
further, elucidates the words'ruh; 'nafs' and'^aql'. 
Rulj, too, has got, two meanings: one being the material 
substance and another being immaterial subtle thing 
74 
which is called soul, not life. He quotes the 
Qu'ran on this point They ask you about rub; says 
75 ' 
it is command from my Lord". It is the second sense 
that rub is source of knowledge. Nafs also has two 
meanings. According to the first meaning it is 
'passion' or the baser and lower self and according to 
the secc^d 
/ meaning it is soul as described above which has been 
72. Cf. IJnya'Eng, tr. Book iii P. 2» 
* 
73. Cf. Loc.cit* 
74. Cf. Ibid., PP. 2-3* 
75. Sura, XVII: 85 * 
S3 
termed by the Qur'an aa nafs~al-Mutma ' innah or 
the contented soul. The word '^aql' has got many-
meanings. Among these one is 'intellect' through 
which true nature of the material world is known, 
and according to another meaning it is the power 
7 f\ 
to understand the secrets of different learnings. 
By giving different meanings of these words al-
Ghazali intends to refer to a simple substance 
which is common to all of them and that is not the 
thing of this material world; it has come as a guest 
and all the organs of human body are under its 
command. This is the 'soul'' by which al-GhazaXT 
neither means the animal spirit (ruh al-haiwaniyyah) 
nor the natural spirit ( ruh at-tabi*ah ;. Let us 
see what l^e means by soul, " ... the soul I mean 
only tliat perfect, simple substance which is con-
cerned solely with remembering and studying and 
reflection and discrimination and careful consi-
deration. It is receptive of all types of knowledge 
and does not weary of receiving images which are 
abstract, immaterial and this substance is the ruler 
of the spirits ( i.e., these aforementioned) and the 
controller of the faculties, and all serve it and 
comply with its command. Now, the rational soul. 
76. Cf. Op.cit. PP. 3-4 
73. Cf. Kimija-ye Sa^adat. Beng. tr. Vol. 1 P.36 
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by which I mean, this substance, has a special 
name with every group of people. The philosophers 
call this substance "the rational soul"(nafs an-
naTtiqah), and the Qur'an calls it the"contented 
soul" and the sufis call it the "spirit" and some-
times the "heart", but though the names differ, 
the meaning is one that does not differ. In our 
opinion the "heart" and,the "Spirit" and the con-
tented soul, are names of the rational soul, and 
the rational soul is the living substance which 
exists and acts and comprehends, and when we use 
the term "spirit" in an absolute sense or the 
word "heart", we mean by it only this substance. 
In view of al-Ghazall human being is com-
prised of three contttuents: the body, the accident 
and the simple substance. The animal spirit is a 
subtle thing like a lamp, which has been kindled 
and placed in the glass-vessel of the heart, by 
which al-Ghazall means that conical object which 
is suspended in the breast, and life is'the light 
of lamp and blood is its oil, and feeling and move-
ments are its flames, and the passion is its smoke, 
the force seeking for substance ( i.e. appetite), 
78. Ar-Risalat-al-Laduniyya, PP. 194-95. 
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which is situated in the liver, is its servant, 
guard and protector, and this spirit is found in 
79 
all the animals. This spirit neither follows the 
right road co knowledge nor the path which leads 
one to t^ e Creator. It is only a servant, a captive 
80 
that dies with the death of the body. Man is laid 
under obligations and addressed by God because of 
another element found only in him, which is over 
and above the former and is applicable especially 
to him. And that meaning indicates the rational 
soul and the spirit-at-rest, and this spirit is 
neither a body nor an accident, for it proceeded at 
81 
the Command of God. 
Al-Ghazall pleads that the command of the 
Creator is neither a body nor an accident, but a 
Divine force like Universal Mind, ( al-^/\ql-al~Awwal ) 
and the Tablet and the Pen, and they are simple 
substances free from materiality; indeed. They are 
incorporeal radiances, intellectual and without 
82 
sensibility. The spirit or the heart,in al-Ghazali's 
use of the term, is derived from those substances. 
79. Ibid., PP. 195-96' 
80. Ibid., P. 196-
81. Cf. Loc.cit. 
82. Ibid., P. 197. 
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and it neither disappears nor passes into nothing-
ness, nor dies, but is separated from the body 
and expects to return to it on the Day of Resur-
rection: and that was declared to be the case in 
the Shari^ 'ah and was authenticated by these 
sciences which are established by categorical 
proofs. Hence, al-Ghazall holds, it is evident 
that the rational spirit is neither a body nor an 
accident; indeed it is an abiding, eternal subs-
83 
tance, and incorruptible. 
Al-Ghazall claims that only simple subs-
tance, that is the spirit or the heart receives 
images of things known and understands the real 
meaning of existing thing, without being concerned 
with their actual selves or corporeal forms, for 
the rational soul is capable of knowing the real 
meaning of humanity without seeing a human being, 
as it is acquainted with the angels and demons, but 
has no need to see their forms, since the senses 
of 1lt?st human beings do not attain to them. 
Al-Ghazall terms soul as the house of 
knowledge, divine knowledge is the goal to which 
83. Loc.cit, 
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human soul is destined to move. Man's soul 
has got a natural capacity of knowing truth. 
God says about soul: "I placed this trust upon 
the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but 
they all refused to carry it and feared it, but 
85 
only man has borne it". In the interpretation 
of the above verse of the Qur'an al-Ghazall main-
tains that soul has got such a special attribute 
which is not possessed by the heavens, the earth 
and the mountains. That is why, they have been 
made subservient to man. The trust is Divine 
86 
knowledge or Tawhid.' 
Al-Ghazali refers to sufis who hold that 
the heart possesses an organ of sight like the 
body, and outward things are seen with the outward 
eye, and the inward realities with the eye of the 
mind. The Prophet(s) said: "Every servant has 
two eyes in his heart" and these are eyes by which 
he perceives the invisible, and when God wishes 
well to one of His servants He opens the eyes of 
his, so that he may see what is hidden from his 
87 
outward sight. He says that the vision is a subtle 
84. Ihya'Eng. tr. Book III-P.9. 
85. SQra , XXXIII, 72* 
86. Op.cit.^PP. 15-16* 
87. Ar-Risilat-al-Ladunlyya, Eng. tr. P. 198. 
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essence or latifah with which spiritual things 
88 —^ -^  
are seen. As the eye is concerned with the sight 
of visible things and the hearing is assiduous in 
listening to sounds, and the tongue is alert to 
form words, and as the animal spirits seek the 
delights of passion, and the natural spirit loves 
the pleasures of eating and drinking, so also^the 
'contented spirit, by which al-Ghazill means the 
heart—the simple substance, seeks only knowledge 
89 
and is not satisfied except with it. , 
Al-Ghazali observes that knowledge is 
implanted within all human souls and all of them 
are capable of receiving all types of knowledge. 
Only a soul may miss its appointed share of that, 
because of something intervening or something 
90 
occurring to it unexpectedly from outside. So, 
the rational human soul, al-Ghazall proceeds, is 
worthy to be enlightened by Universal soul and is 
fitted to receive intelligible images from it, by 
91 
the power of original purity and its primal innocence. 
88. Op.cit, p. 19-
89. Op.cit, p. 200; Cf.Kimiya-ye-Sa-^adat Beng.tr. 
Vol. I, P. 67-
90T Ibid., P. 368-
91. Ibid., PP. 368-69' 
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Al-Ghazill has some reservations on this issue, 
and contends that all the human souls cannot receive 
the knowledge from on high, because some souls have 
become diseased in chis world and are prevented 
92 
from apprehending the true meaning of things. 
Al-^ jhazall refers to the obstacles or hurdles 
which prohibit the human soul to acquirev,the know-
ledge of the spiritual world. He compares it with 
mirror and says that a picture cannot be seen in a 
mirror if the stuff with which it is made is spoiled 
by impurities. In the same way, the human soul may 
be defiled with the impurities of sins owing to greed, 
passion and low desires. Truth is not reflected in 
human soul, if the impurities of sins are not removed 
93 
just like the impurities in a mirror. Another obs-
tacle which prevents the soul from acquiring spiri-
tual knowledge is the lack of proper direction just 
like mirror that is not directed towards a figure or 
picture in this case; nothing will appear on it. In 
the same way the light of truth is not reflected in 
a soul in case the object of enquiry not being directed 
94 
towards it, although it is clean and pure. A picture 
92. Ibid., P. 369-
93. Cf. Ihya'Eng. tr. Book III PP. 13-14 • 
94. Ibid., P. 14. 
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cannot be seen in a mirror if something exists 
between a mirror and a picture or figure. So also, 
if there is a veil between a human soul and a thing 
desired, its true picture cannot be reflected in 
95 
soul. Al-Ghazall further elucidates another obs-
tacle which hinders the real knowledge, and that is 
the ignorance of proper method. For instance, if a 
student pursues an unknown subject, it will not be 
possible to understand it until he pursues the proper 
method, the prescribed method of the learned, and 
various kinds of relations of his subject with other 
sciences that are essential to be studied as a pre-
requisite condition. Knowledge streches its roots 
in different fields, and one has to know how to unite 
the scattered roots. Knowledge cannot arise unless 
the mode of union is known. If one does not stand 
in front of a mirror, one cannot see one's face-
therein. If the mirror is kept in front of some-
one's face, he cannot see his back. So, there are 
96 
certain conditions of acquiring knowledge. 
95. Ibid., P. 15 
96. Loc.cit. 
!ij. 
Al-'-^ hazall holds the view that knowledge is 
implanted within all human souls at the time of their 
creation and due to their worldly engagement, the 
capability of receiving impressions from the universal 
soul is suspended and the clouds of forgetfulness 
97 
affect minds. Some souls occupy themselves with 
study, and they seek to recover their original health, 
and their infirmities disappear by the application 
98 
of certain simple remedies. Some of them study 
throughout their lives and occupy themselves with 
learning, but fail to recover their original state, 
as their infirmities are not ej-adicated by the proper, 
use of the simplest remedies. Such a soul lapses in 
99 
forgetfulness. Al-Ghazall talks about another class 
of souls who study all their lives, and occupy them-
selves in learning and trying to recover perfection, 
all their days, but fail to understand anything, 
because of the corruption of their natural dispositions, 
for, their dispositions are corrupt and not receptive 
100 
to cure. Some of the souls, al-Ghazall says, learn 
and then forget, they find iittle light and some 
101 
debilitated illumination. The cause of these dis-
tinctions, according to al-Ghazall, is the souls* 
97. Ar-Risalat-al-Laduniyya , Eng. tr, P. 369 
98. Loc.cit. 
99. Loc.cit. 
100.Ibid., PP. 369-70* 
101. Ibid.,P. 370 • 
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preoccupation with this world. When this blockade 
is removed the souls acknowledge the existence of 
knowledge from on high and realize that they were 
wiser in their original state, and purer when they 
were first created than their present state, and 
their ignorance arose only through their association 
with this gross body and their continuance in this 
102 
abode of trouble and place of darkness. 
Al-Ghazali remarks that sufia are interested 
in acquiring knowledge through ilham, i.e., intuition 
103 
of inspiration. Now, the question arises: how one can 
gain the power of intuition? Al-Ghazall says that it 
requires rigorous spiritual labour and patience and, 
104 
also, carefulness towards duty. In order to gain 
this special kind of knowledge one should save oneself 
from the condemnable evils, scissoring all connections 
and directing all efforts towards God. When it is 
earned, God Himself becomes the caretaker of human soul, 
He saves it by enkindling the light of knowledge in 
105 
soul. When God takes care of a particular soul, mercy 
102. Loc.cit. 
^^^' Ihya Eng. tr. Book III P. 22' 
104. Cf. Kimiya-ye-Sa^adat Beng. tr. Vol. I, PP.56« 
105. Op.cit., P. 22 . 
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falls on it, light sparkles, breast expends, and 
the secrets of the spiritual world are disclosed 
to it. By the help of God, the screens of darkness 
are removed from the upper portion of one's soul and 
106 
real nature of divine affairs comes to him. The 
novice who is desirous to have knowledge of the Divine 
reality should purify his soul and make efforts with 
107 
true and sincere intention. 
According to al-Ghazali, the secrets of the 
heaven and earth are unfolded to the hearts of Prophets 
and friends of God ( awliya Allah) A flood of light 
illumines their breasts. It is not due to their 
acquired knowledge by efforts but due. to their spiritual 
exercise full freedom from worldly connections 
l08 
and full devotion of all their energies to God. By 
this, souls become vacant for God and,the screens 
between Lawh-al-Mahfuz ( ^Guarded Tablet ) and the 
mirror of the soul are removed. And, thus, the picture 
of every thing that will occur up to the Day of Resur-
rection preserved in the Guarded Tablet will be ref-
lected on the mirror of the soul. If there is no 
106. Loc.cit. 
107. Loc.cit. 
108. Ibid., PP. 22-23. 
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screen between the two, what is inscribed on the 
Guarded Tablet is reflected in the mirror of the 
soul. The wind of latlfah sometimes removes the 
screen from the mirror of the soul, and discloses 
l09 
what is in the Guarded Tablet. 
Al-Ghazall claims 'that the knowledge which 
has been bestowed upon a soul during the time of its 
creation does not disappear, but lapses only to 
forgetfulness. When the soul purifies itself from 
lusts and passions, it recovers its earlier position 
and the fetters of forgetfulness are thrown away, 
and the soul returns to its original state, then, it 
remembers what it had forgotten in the days of flick-
ness. What the soul had learnt did not disappear, 
it was only forgotten; and there is a distinction 
between obliteration and forgetfulness. For, obli-
teration is the disappearance of what is encrraved and 
impressed, while forgetfulness is the obscuring of 
impressions, and it is like the mist or cloud which 
veil the light of the sun from the eyes of the on — 
110 
lookers and it is not like the sunset. From this al-
109. Ibid., P. 22' 
110. Ar-Risalat-al-Laduniyya, Eng. tr. P. 371* 
!h) 
Ghazall wants to conclude that knowledge which 
potentially exists in human soul does not pass 
away or gets ruined, it subsists implicitly, which 
may be recovered in its original shape. 
LIMITATIONo OF SENSE-PERCEPTION AND REASON 
According to al-Ghazall when a man gets 
himself freed from the impurities of heart, and 
diverts his full attention towards the things of 
the spiritual world his intuitive faculty is 
awakened. He may receive information of the Celes-
tial world that may not be received by the intellec-
tual process, i.e., sense-perception and reason. 
Al-Ghazali highlights the role of sense perception 
in the acquisition of the knowledge of the pheno-
menal world. But, side by side, he suggests the 
limitations of the sense-perception in the process 
of cognition. Al-Ghazall says that the senses are 
created only for acquiring the knowledge of the 
material world. They can not help in acquiring 
111 
knowledge of the spiritual world, the world which 
is ever beyond the reach of reason,a higher apparatus 
of knowledge than sense-perception. It is not impro-
bable, he points out in one place, '0 you who inhabit 
111. Kimiyi, ye-Sa^adat, Be.ng, tr. vol. I, P. 55. 
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the world of reason, that beyond reason there 
exists another plane at vhich appear things that 
do not appear in reason, just as it is not impro-
baiole that reason should be a plane transcending 
discrimination and sensesation, in which strange 
and marvellous things are revealed that sensation 
112 
and discrimination fall short of attaining". Al-
Ghazall does not deny the significance of the intel-
lectual knowledge. He wants to show that it has 
some limitations which make it unable to attain the 
light which can be brought by intuition. He says 
that the knowledge acquired by study and deduction 
is no' doubt a good thing but it is limited in com-
parison to the knowledge of prophets and saints. 
Because their hearts receive knowledge from God Him-
self. They do not depend on human beings for their 
113 knowledge. 
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD THRQUGH INTUITION 
Knowledge of God is the most crucial problem 
of epistemology. Controversy is very often found 
as to whether any authentic knowledge of God is 
112. Al-Ghazali, Al-Jawihlr al-Gbawali; Cairo:1343 A.H.P. 
Cf. Faith_and Practice.P.64? Cf.JllanI, Shaikh 13 
^Abd al-Qadir- Futu^ i-al-Ciiaib. Urdu translation, 
Lahore:1344 A.H. P. 21, Discourse-9. 
113. Op.cit., P. 56 • 
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possible or not. In the theistic religions, the 
knowledge of God is the most important issue. In 
every religious scripture some informations regar-
ding God are found. Since, God is the Central theme 
of all the theistic religions, the followers of 
different creeds do make some attempt to acquire the 
knowledge of God. They, naturally, do have eagerness 
to know the Qbject VJhom they worship. In Islam, the 
Qur'an is the primary source of knov;ledge regarding 
Gol. Next to the Qur'an is the Tradition of the 
Prophet(s), in v;hich also we can have some information 
regarding God. It is also held that God being the 
creator ot the world, can be known through guidance 
of rightly guided one^and contemplation of His creation. 
Muslim mystics, that is the Sufis, claim that God can 
be known through another way with the employment of a 
special spiritual faculty, when one purifies oneself 
from the worldliness, concentrates and contemplates on 
God, the Most High, His majesty may kindly disclose 
some light regarding Himself to that soul, 
Al-Ghazali,turning to sufism in his later phase, 
approaches this issue from is sufistic view-point. To 
him, spiritual knowledge includes among other things -
f]5 
114 
the knowledge of God. Rather, he contends that 
Divine knowledge is the best of all kinds of 
115 - -
knowledge. According al-Ghazali, there are 
various grades of the knowledge of God, The 
lowest grade is the faith of common people based 
on authority and tradition. At a higher level is 
the knowledge of the learned based on deduction 
and reflection. But the highest kind of knowledge 
116 
is gained through mukashafa'K ' 
Al-Ghazall points out that ^ilm al~mukasJiafah 
is related to the knowledge of God and the essence 
of things, and that it cannot be attained without 
*'ilm-al-mu^amalah of which the love of God and thirst 
for the knowledge of reality are the most important 
aspects. He says categorically that if a man occu-
pies himself with the purification of the heart,and 
does not see): God, he will not attain the knowledge 
of God, Whatever then he attains will not be ^ilm-al 
117 
muka&hafah. From this it is also clear that mere 
•^•^ "^ IMi' ^^^' ^^' ^°°^ ^^' ^' ^^ '^ 
115, Loc.cit. 
2 - ^ 
^zali 
Ihya' Vols.IlJ,p.l4; the 
1, PP,18-19, 
116, Ethical Philosophy of al-Gh^zali . P.l09r 
authd>j£ refers to al-Ghazall's Ihya" 
117, Ihya' Vol, III, P. 12 
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Purification of heart and total abstinance from 
sinful works do not suffice to have the knowledge 
of God. 
Al-Ghazall contends that the knowledge of 
God is related to the love of God. He considers 
the knowledge of God as a condition for the perfec-
tion of man; because without it love of God is not 
possible. But knowledge of God does not mean love 
of God in all instances. Hence, love of God is a 
118 
higher ideal than mere knowledge. To al-Ghazall , 
the highest stage . of knowledge is attained through 
the highest form of love. Knowledge may be percep-
119 
tual and supra-perceptual. The former is the appre-
hension of objects through the senses. Perceptual 
knowledge of objects and their love is common to all 
men and animals. God cannot be known immediately 
through perceptual knowledge; consequently. He cannot 
be an object of love determined by such knowledge. 
Knowledge of Godis supra^perceptual. Man alone is 
capable of such knowledge. This knowledge occurs 
through faith, reflection, reasoning and ^-mystic 
118. Ethical Philosopv, P. 122. 
119. Ihya*,Y2l' ^ V, P. 255 . 
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experience (^ Ilm al-mukasliafa ), the enumeration 
being in the ascending order of spiritual develop-
ment. Love of God is associated, in the heart of 
the seeker, with every type of supraperceptual 
knowledge of God. But the highest and the most 
complete love is associated with intuition, the 
12o highest type of knowledge. 
RELATION BETWEEN INTELLECT AND INTUITION; 
Intellect(^aql), as an independent source of 
knowledge, has got an important place in al-Ghazall's 
epistemology. The word'^aql' has been used in 
different senses. It refers commonly in the usage 
of theologians to demonstrative reason. It is the 
activity ( or faculty ) that proves, defends, and 
elicits conclusions implied by the premises. In a 
more general sense, *aql is man's basic apprehending 
faculty, that which distinguishes him from animals 
121 
and by which he acquires theoretical knowledge. But 
the term also refers to "light of inner perception" 
-122 
or 'light of certainty' ( Yaqin),as used by the sufis. 
120. Op.cit.,P.123» 
•^^•^' Ihya,' Vol. I, P. 75* 
122. Ibid., P. 79. 
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Al-Ghazall maintains that ^aql , as man's basic 
instinctive reason ( gharizat al-'aql), refers to 
the same thing denoted by the sufi term mukaaijafali . 
Thus, while al-Ghazall distinguishes the mystical 
apprehension from ^aql as demonstrative reason, he 
identifies it with ^aql as'the basic human cognitive 
123 
faculty. Here it will not be out of the place to 
point out that in the Twentieth Century Bergson also 
defined intuition as an instinct that is self-cons-
cious. Al-Ghazali's definition of mystic experience 
in terms of instinctive reason is very close to 
Bergson's view, 
Al-Ghazall says that intellectual knowledge 
is simple in itself,but it gives rise to a composite 
knowledge, which includes all the states of the simple 
types of knowledge, and, that composite knowledge is 
the knowledge attained by sufis- in the course of 
124 
their journey through mystic states, Aj.Ghagall 
adds that sufis have evolved a simple method denoted 
by a particular way of life which combines the two 
types of knowledge. Different stages in a sufps 
journey towards the ultimate knowledge are termed as 
l23,LQG,Clt. 
124, Ar-Risalat, Eng,tr. P, 359, 
10, 
the mystic state ( hal ), the spiritual condition 
(al-waqt), audition ( sama^), ecstacy ( wajd), 
longing (talab or ^islig), intoxication ( sulcr), 
sobriety ( sahw) affirmation ( jthb'at ) and efface-
ment and poverty ( faqr) and the passing away of 
self { fani ). The peculiar notions of saintship 
and discipleship, and the position of shaikh and his 
relation with his disciples, and what is involved in 
their states, together with spiritual illumination, 
125 
also form sufistic epistemological terminology. So, 
* 
al-C^ hazili highlights the importance of intellectual 
knowledge as a prerequisite condition for the acqui-
sition of intuitive knowledge, and also in leading a 
sufistic life, 
Al-Ghazali, as we have noticed, has given 
higher status to intuitive knowledge in comparison 
with intellectual knowledge. But in every aspect of 
life, be it either religious or worldly, he does not 
ignore the importance of intellectual pursuits, Al-
Ghazall maintains that intellectual knowledge is 
somehow linked with intuitive knowledge. To him, human 
soul is capable of attaining perfection, but to 
attain it, it has to pass through many stages of 
development, viz., sensuous { fqahsusah ), imaginative 
125, Ibid,, PP, 359-60. 
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( muta]$Jipiyyl^ ,ah ) , instinctive ( mawhumat ) rational 
( ma^qulat ) and the ^ivine ( Ilahiyat ) . In 
the first place, man is like a moth , which has no 
memory, and beats time and again against the candle. 
In the second stage, man is like a lower animal 
which, once beaten, runs away when he sees a stick. 
In the third stage, he resembles a higher animal, 
e.g. a horse which instinctively avoids a danger and 
flees away from a lion who is its natural enemy, but 
is not afraid of a camel. In the fourth stage, he 
transcends this limit also. He apprehends objects 
which are beyond the scope of his senses and can form 
general concepts underlying particular objects. In 
the fifth stage, he is able to apprehend the reality 
of spiritual things. This stage is reached by prophets 
and saints. At this stage, the reality of the soul 
and the significance of other spiritual things are 
126 
received to man. With this illustration al-Ghazall 
wants to show that in order to reach intuitive know-
ledge a man needs to pass through the intellectual 
stage. So, intellectual knowledge is essential phase 
of intuitive knowledge, 
126. Ethical Philosophy al-Ghazill, P. 99-
104 
Al-Ghazall miintains that some sorts of 
divine knowledge ( ma^rifah ) may be achieved from 
the study of'the nature*. The world where we live, 
is the creation of God, So, the Creator may be 
known through the observation of his creation, 
127 
the world, Al-Ghazali adds that with the help 
of external senses such as eye, nose, etc, the 
internal faculties such reason, conscience, the 
power of deliberation; various artistic skills of 
this world may be realized which ultimately lead to 
128 
the ma^rifah of God. It may be inferred that al-
Ghazall accepts the importance artistic skills and 
positive sciences that prepare man for intuitive 
knowledge. If 'ma^rifah of God' is the highest end 
( sa'adah as-sa4adat ) of human life, intellect that 
leads to intuition wouldbe an important means, or, 
at least, a starting point on the way to attain the 
ultimate goal. 
In this chapter we have confirmed our study 
to the elaboration of al-Ghagali's views on the 
different sources of knowledge, leaving the issue 
of the nature of knowledge to be dealt with in the 
next chapter. 
127. Klmiya-ye-oa*adat, Beng.tr. Vol. I, P,40' 
128. Cf. Loc. cit. 
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AL-GHAZALI's NOTION OF THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 
The nature of knowledge is one of the three 
basic problems of epistemology. In this Chapter, we 
shall see whether al-Ghazall does have any concern 
with the nature of knowledge. A careful study of al-
Ghazall's philosophy may reveal that he is aware of 
the significance of the problem. He might not have 
elaborated each and every aspect of the issue very 
clearly and distinctly, like the modern epistemolo-
gists, but this does not mean that he had no idea of 
the relevant issues. 
Al-Ghazall's division of the worlds into 
(i) ^alam al-mulk wa sJjahada ( the material and the 
phenomenal world (ii) ^alam al-malakut ( the divine 
world, and (iii) ^alam al-jaharlit ( the world of mind -
1 
reason, will and power ) is indicative of his concern 
for distinguishing various kinds of knowledge and their 
nature. The material world is also named by al-Ghazill 
as ^alam al-mahsusat. He maintains that in comparison 
with the divine world the material world is very small 
2 
and limited. The material world is non-static, and 
1. Cf. Ihyi', Vol. iv P. 216. 
2. Kimlya-ye-Sd^adat, Beng. tr. Vol. I P. 52. 
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always subject to change. That is why, the knowledge 
3 
of this world cannot be flawless and perfect, Al-Ghazali 
says that the knowledge of the material or phenomenal 
world is achieved with the help of the five senses. 
Human mind cannot have the knowledge of this world 
directly. The impressions, the senses receive from 
the phenomenal world reach the human soul through diffe-
rent ways. If the snense-organs do not function pro-
perly, there is every possibility of the origination of 
the false impressions which may ultimately lead to a 
4 
wrong conception of a particular object, 
Al-Ghazall holds that a phenomenon or appearance 
is a relative term, for a thing necessarily appears to, 
or is concealed from, something other than itself, and 
thus, its appearance and non-appearance are both rela-
tive. Further, its appearance and non-appearance are 
5 
also relative to perceptive faculties i.e. the senses. 
Al-Ghazall gives an account of many defects in these 
faculties. Among the^e sense of sight is most important. 
3, Loc-cit. 
4, Cf. Loc.cit. 
5, MisJakat al-Anwar, Eng. tr. P. 80. 
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it is blurred with so many defects and obstacles 
that correct information can be hardly received 
through it. The eye does not behold itself. It 
neither sees what is very near to it nor what is 
very far away from it. The eye can perceive the 
6 
exterior surfaces of things but not their interiors. 
Al-Ghazall adds that the eye only sees the fraction 
of what exists, for, all concepts and many percepts, 
are beyond its reach. The eye does not see what is 
infinite. What it sees is the attributes of known 
bodies, and these can only be conceived as finite. 
The other <iefect of the faculty of sight is that it 
apprehends the large as small. It sees the colossal 
sun in the size of a bowl, and the stars like silver-
7 
pieces scattered upon a carpet of azure. From al-
Ghazali's explanation of the power of vision it 
seems that the eye cannot observe a particular object 
as it is. Due to some of its limitations the real 
things, to a large extent, remain unknown. Ghazali's 
view on this issue seems to have some similarity with 
that of the critical realists of the twentieth century. 
6. Cf. Ibid., PP. 83-85 -
7. Ibid., PP. 86-89 . 
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according to whom, what we perceive are the snse-
8 
data^but not the physical object itself. 
Al-Ghazall maintains that the world of the 
celestial bodies lies beyond the capacity of the 
senses. The material world and things found in it, 
9 
are the objects of sense-perception . The 'Supernal 
world' is a world invisible to the majority of men. 
No man can approach near Allah unless he advances 
towards the very centre of the Fold of the Divine 
Holiness. By the 'world of the Divine Holiness', al 
Ghazali means the world that transcends the apprehen-
10 
sion of the sense and the imagination. 
Al-Ghazali says that the phenomenal light can 
be conceived of as disappearing with the sinking of 
the Sun, and as assuming a veil in-order that the 
shadow may appear: while the pivine Light, which is 
the condition of all appearances cannot be conceived 
11 
as disappearing. Al-Ghazall conceives relationship 
8. Cf. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, PP.25-26* 
9. Cf. Op.cit., P. 93« 
10. Ibid., PP.123-124-
11. Ibid., PP. 118-119» 
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between the visible and the invisible worlds. To 
him, the visible world is the first step in the 
journey upto the'realm supernal'. He argues that 
if there were no relationship between the two 
worlds, no inter-connection at all, then all upward 
12 
progress would be incd?§ivable. For him, due to the 
divine mercy the visible world has got a correspondence 
with the 'realm supernal'. That is why, al-Ghazali 
claims that there is not a single thing in this 'world 
13 
of sense' that is not a symbol of something yonder. 
Al-Ghazall further holds that one thing in this 
world may symbolize several things in the 'realm supernal' 
and also that one thing in the latter may have several 
symbols in the 'world of visible' . According to him, 
a thing is called typical of symoolic when it resem-
14 bles or corresponds to its architype in some aspect. 
Al-Ghazali clarifies his position regarding the 
'world supernal'by saying that he does not mean by it 
the world of the seven heavens, though they are "above" 
in respect to our world of sense-perception. These 
12. Loc.cit. 
13. Loc.cit' 
14. Ibid., 126-
lui 
heavens are equally present to our apprehension, 
15 
and also to that of the lower animals. A man finds 
the doors of the 'realm celestial' closed on him; 
neither does he become of nor belongs to that realm 
unless as he quotes the verses of the Qur'an, "This 
earth to him be changed into that which is not earth, 
16 
and likewise the heavens". Some people may transcend 
the limitations of the visible world and heavens, and 
proceed to approach the ' Bresence of Dominical'. 
Thus, mankind does make an attempt to rise to the 
17 
world of the 'Highest Height'. 
About the t»rophets, al-Ghazall says that when 
their ascents reached the world of 'realm celestial', 
they attained the uttermost goal, and from that place 
looked down upon a totality of the 'world invisible' 
for, al-Ghazall maintains, he who is with God, has the 
~ 18 
keys of the unseen. When an individual reaches that 
plane of Reality, he knows that how the causes of 
existing things descend into the world of sense. As 
al-Ghazali has already pointed out, the world of 
15. Ibid., 95-
16. Sura, XIV, 48* 
17. Op.cit., P. 95* 
18. Ibid., P. 96 • 
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sense is an effect of the yonder world of cause, 
resulting from it just as the shadow results from 
a body, or as a fruit from that which fructuates, 
or as the effect from a cause. The key to this 
knowledge of the effect is sought and found in the 
cause. And for this reason, al-Ghazall maintains, 
the world of sense is a prototype of the world of the 
'realm celestial. For the thing compared is in some 
sort parallel, and bears resemblance, to the thing 
compared therwith, whether that resemblance be remote 
20 
or near..^  
Al-(jhazali's division of the worlds seems to 
have some resemblance to the Kantian division. Kant 
divides the worlds into the phenomenal and noumenal 
ones. The former is the object of our sense-perception^ 
the world of appearance, but the latter world—World 
in-itself is unknowable by sense perception, Kant 
maintains that we cannot transcend our experience, nor 
we have apriori knowledge of the supersensible of 
things-in-themselves ( noumena), of things as they 
are apart from the way they affect consciousness, 
19. Loc. cit. 
20. Ibid., PP. 96-97. 
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Knowledge involves perception, but things in them-
selves cannot be perceived by the senses; through 
sense-perception we know only the way things appear 
to consciousness, not what they are in themselves. 
Kant adds that they cannot even be perceived or intuited 
by the intellect. We cannot prove, for example, that 
behind everything there is a substance in an intelli-
gible world. We can, however, as Kant maintains, think 
of such a thing-in-itself, speak of it as something 
to which none of the predicates of sense-perception 
applies, say that it is not in space nor in time,that 
it does not change, and so on. Not a single category, 
however, can be applied to it, because we have no means 
of knowing whether anything corresponding to it exists. 
Thus, Kant holds that thing-in-itself is essentially 
unknowable, but the concept of a thing-in-itself is not 
self-contradictory, for, we surely cannot maintain that 
the phenomenal order is the only possible one. We can 
have sensible knowledge only of a sensible thing, not 
22 
of a thing-in-itself. Thus, in Kantian epistemology 
thing-in-itself, i.e., the noumenon, cannot be an object 
21. Thilly,Frank, A History of Philosophy, Revised by 
Ledger Wood,Allahabad: Central Publishing House 
Third edition, 1984, P. 427. 
22. Ibid., P. 428* 
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of knowledge. Hence in Kant's theory of knowledge 
no knowledge of God is possible. Because God tran-
scends our sense- perception. 
As far the division of the worlds, al-Ghazall 
and Kant do have some similarities, but as far as the 
nature of knowledge is concerned they have got some 
significant differences, Al-Ghazali's *alam-al malakut? 
i.e. (the world supernal) can be known., by Prophets and 
mystics. In Chapter second we have already elaborated 
that prophets and mystics can transcend the limitation 
of the perceptual world. With the purification of their 
souls from the impurities of the senses, lusts, and 
greeds they may spiritually reach to the world celestial 
which is the original abode of the souls. 
The difference between al-Ghazali and Kant has 
even been pointed out by Dr. Iqbal. He writes: "Kant 
consistently with his principles, could not affirm the 
possibility of the knowledge of God. Ghazall, finding 
no hope in analytic thought, moved to mystic experience, 
and then found an independent content for religion. In 
this way he succeeded in securing for religion the 
114 
right to exist independently of science and meta-
23 
physics". 
To sxim up the entire problem, in al-Ghazali's 
epistemology, both the ^alam-al-mulk and ^alam-al-
malakut are objects of knowledge, ^Alam a-mulk'may 
be known by every individual, because it is perceivable^ 
but the ^ alam-al-malakut' being unperceivable, requires 
some faculty other than senses to be known. Here, he 
maintains that every individual cannot know this world. 
Since this is the supraeensible world, this can only 
be known by the development of such a faculty as can 
transcend the limits of sensation. According to al-
Ghazali, only Prophets and mystics have got such quali-
24 
ties. Thus he holds that human beings are different 
according to their dispositions. Only a few are capable 
of attaining the highest form of knowledge that is 
certain, definite, unchangeable and absolute. Naturally 
human knowledge of this world is not certain, defihite 
and absolute. It is susceptible to change, is indefinite 
and cannot be fully relied upon. 
23. Iqba1, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought 
in Islam, P. 5 • 
24, Ihya £ng. Tr. Vol.. I, P. 24' 
C H A P T E R - IV 
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AL-GHAZALI ON THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
In the previous two chapters, we have dealt 
with al-Ghazali's views on the sources and nature 
of knowledge. The other basic problem with refe-
rence to al-Ghazall's epistemology is that of the 
validity of knowledge. As discussed in the first 
chapter three tests of the validity of knowledge 
have been accepted by different schools of philo-
sophy which are: correspondence, coherence and 
consequences of believing in any idea as true (i.e. 
pragmatic test ). 
The problem of the validity of knowledge has 
not been explicitly discussed by al-Ghazall. Never-
thless, from the study of his works it seems that 
he is not totally indifferent to the importance of 
this problem in theory of knowledge. But he has 
not elaborated this problem with special care. 
Here, we shall try to construct his view on the 
problem of the validity of knowledge. According 
to al-Ghazall, we cognize the external world and 
its objects through the five senses. He maintains 
that man's information about the world is by means of 
l l i i 
perception, and every perception of the perceptibles 
is created so that man may have acquaintance with a 
world from among existents. By 'Worlds', al-Ghazali 
means 'classes of existents'. 
There seems to be some resemblance between 
the correspondence theory of truth and the above 
position of al-Ghazali. In correspondence theory* 
a statement would be considered to be true or valid 
when it describes the fact or agrees with the actual 
situation. Al-Ghazali would also like to point out 
the same thing by saying that with the help of the 
faculties of perception man makes himself acquainted 
with the world i.e. the actual situation of-tiha world, 
On the basis of this acquaintance he makes judgements 
about different things of the world. Man's acquain-
tance and the formation of his judgments should be in 
correspondence with the reality. Al-^hazall main-
tains that all knowledge of the sciences and arts 
acquired through the senses, and this knowledge 
correspondens to four kinds of existence, namely, 
material ( Jismani ), factual ( haqiql), ideational 
1. Faith and Practice, P. 63. 
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^ khayali ) and intellectual ( ^ aqli ). Our ordinary 
knowledge of the external world is related to these 
2 
four kinds of existence. Al-Ghazall, as we have 
already seen, accepts reason as one of the sources 
of knowledge. Reason makes one capable to discern 
the possibility of possible things, such as, the 
knowledge, 'two is greater than one' and 'one indi-
vidual cannot be in two different places at the 
3 
same time'. Here, al-Ghazali seems to have put 
stress on consistency and coherence in knowledge. 
The coherence theory of truth or knowledge places 
its trust in the consistency or harmony of judgements. 
Al-Ghazall is also an advocate of these criteria. 
Respite his refutation of the law of causation, al-
GJhazall considers sense-perception dbo be the source 
of knowledge about the physical world. But he is not 
a thorough empiricist. He, at the same time, high-
lights the significance of reason and intellect both 
in their scientific and metaphysical senses. Al-
Ghazall's skepticism that was caused by his denial of 
casuality led him in his quest for dependable,absolute 
2. Kimlya-ye-Sa*adat, P. 12' 
3. Al-Ghazali , Kitab-al-^Ilm of Ihya'* Eng. tr. 
PP. 226- 27. 
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and definite knowledge to test another source 
of knowledge, that is mystic experience or intui-
tion. 
At this juncture it is essential to give a 
brief account of his view of the unreliability of 
empirical and rational knowledge. 
EMPIRICISM 
Although al-Gl^ azali accepts the role of sense-
perception in the knowledge of the phenomenal world, 
he has pointed out its limitations which sometimes 
lead us to erroneous conclusions. Empirical know-
ledge is based on the law of causation, but al-
Ghazali denies the necessary link between cause and 
effect. According to him, the affirmation of one 
does not entail the affirmation of the other; nor 
4 
does not its denial entail denial of the other. 
By this al-Ghazali wants to point out that the necessary 
relations found in deductive logic and mathematics 
cannot be conceived regarding the causal relation. 
The denial of any conclusion arrived at on the 
ground of deductive logic— the presence of a person 
4. Al-Ghazali' Tahafut al-Falasifah, Eng. tr. 
by Sabi^ Ajimad Karaali , Lahore: Pakistan 
Philosophical Congress, 1958, P. 185» 
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in two different places at the same time, leads us 
to contradiction. The same is the case with mathe-
matics, we cannot deny the necessity that two and 
two is equal to four. But, such contradiction will 
not occur if we deny the necessary connection of 
any two thing$^  which we term as 'cause' and 'effect'; 
such as the quenching of thirst and drinking water? 
satisfaction of hunger and eating, burning and con-
5 
tact with fire, light and the rise of the sun etc. 
By the denial of so-called necessary relation bet-
ween cause and effect al-Gha^all highlights the 
uncertainty and unreliability of empirical knowledge 
that is based on the principles of causation and. 
the uniformity of nature. Here, he stresses on the 
role of the Decree of God which preceded the exis-
tence of all events and incidents. If succession 
of two events is noticed regularly, it is because 
He has destined these events to occur in that fashion; 
not because the relation in Itself is necessary and 
insevecrable. Al- Ghazall's point is that God has 
the power to create any 'effect' or 'event' indepen-
6 
dently of what is supposed to be its 'cause'. 
5. Loccit, 
6. Loc.cit. 
L.ti 
This power of God cannot be revealed through 
observation—a condition of empirifc:al method. By-
observation we notice the fact of burning when-
ever a thing comes in contact with fire. This 
only shows one event occurs after the other. But 
the inherent cause of burning cannot be determined 
7 
by observation. Al-Ghazall explains the mysteries 
of the world with an illustration: If a man sits 
in fire covering himself with asbestos will remain 
unaffected, whereas he who has not devised any 
8 
such device with disbelieve it; the same is with 
the case of different mysteries of the world which 
cannot be conceived by our perceptual faculties. 
Thus, al-Ghazali shows the shortcomings of our 
perceptual faculties, which are the foundation of 
empirical knowledge, in detecting the Inherent 
Principles wnich is the Ultimate Cause of everything 
in the universe. 
Al-Ghazall is of the opinion that our informa-
tions of the phenomenal world in many cases are not 
free from error. This happens partly due to non-
static nature of this world and partly due to the 
7. Ibid., P, 186» 
8. Ibid., P. 191' 
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limitations of our sense-organs. Human mind cannot 
acquire the knowledge of this world directly. If 
the sense-organs fail to function properly, the 
impressions they receive from the phenomenal world 
9 
will ultimately result in error. From this al-
Ghazall infers that the beliefs we hold about the 
phenomenal world are not necessarily true due to 
the limitations inherent in their tools and methods 
employed in acquiring knowledge, 
RATIONALISM 
Finding so many shortcomings in empirical 
method, particularly its failure to convey any accurate 
informations about the world of supernal, al-Ghazall 
proceeds towards rational enquiry with the hope that 
it may satisfy the need for reliable information. 
Although according to al-Ghazali the rational method 
is better organized and less erroneous in comparison 
with empiricism, it still falls short of the require-
ments to dealing with affairs of the reality beyond 
sense and reason both. 
9. Klmiyi ve-Sa<adat, Beng, tr. Vol. 1, P, 52. 
10, Cf. Faith and Practice, PP, 23-24' 
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Logic may be considered to be the proper 
method of any rational enquiry. The function of 
logic, according to al-Ghazili, is to study the 
methods of demonstration, of forming syllogisms, 
and the application of some principles in order to 
evolve consistency in our thought structure. 
Logic is successful in its own realm, but its prin-
ciples fail to lead us to the problems that our 
enquiry faces regard-'ng "the Ultimate Reality. 
Thus, it appears that although al-Ghazali gives 
weightage to logical enquiry, yet he regards it as 
incompetent in dealing with the Divine World and 
its affairs. 
Sxaming different views of the philosophers 
(falasifah) in his Tahafuj;, al-Fa€asifah, al-Ghazall 
comes to the conclusion that their application of 
rational method in dealing with the problems of the 
existence of God, the eternity of the world, physical 
rer-urrection on the Day of Judgment, and God's know-
ledge, particularly as to whether His knowledge is 
of universals only or embraces particulars, utterly 
11. Ibid., PP. 35-36-
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fail and led them to erroneous conclusion. As 
these problems lie beyond the ken of the faculty 
of intellect or reason, it is accessible to neither 
to the senses nor to reason, 
Al-Ghaa^li's final assessment of the rational 
method is that it fails to grasp the significance 
and nature of prophetic revelation and Divine myste-
ries, even though it provides consistent and unequivocal 
judgments in different areas of knowledge that are 
open to man's percetual and intellectual faculties. 
Now we may turn to an important part of al-
Ghazali theory of knowledge. He gives priority to 
the knowledge acquired by revelation and intuition 
over other forms of knowledge, placing at higher than 
intellectual knowledge. He maintains that revelation 
comes only to propnets, and intuitive knowledge can 
equally be shared by prophets and saints who with 
the development of their spiritual faculty acquire 
immediate knowledge from the unseen world which lies 
beyond the reach of the intellectual pursuit. It 
is significant to see how far al-Ghazall is successful 
to prove the v'^ lidity of supra-intellectual knowledge, n 
12^ 
Al-Ghazall seems to have realized the difficulty 
to establish the validity of mystical knowledge by 
intellectual process. He says, " It became clear to 
me, however, that what is most distinctive of mysti-
cism is something which cannot be apprehended by 
study, but only by immediate experience (dhawq means 
13 
literally to taste ), by ecstasy and by a moral change. 
Here al-Ghazall wants to say that the justification 
of mystical knowledge should not be sought through 
intellectual method. The justification of such know-
ledge can only be realized when one is involved in 
such an experience. Al-Ghazall argues that there is 
a distinction between being acquainted with the defi-
nition of drunkenness and being drunk. Indeed, the 
drunken man while in that condition knows neither the 
definition of drunkenness nor the ^cientific account 
of it. The sober man, on the other hand, knows the 
definition of drunkenness and its basis, yet he is not 
drunk in the very least. Similarly, al-^hazali main-
tains, there is a difference between knowing the true 
nature and causes and conditions of the asce-itic life 
and actually leading such a life. 
13. Faith and Practice, PP. 54-b5' 
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Although al-Ghazall faces intellectual diffi-
culty in the justification of mystical knowledge, 
he himself is very much convinced that the knowledge 
acquired by the mystics is valid. There is a very 
strong element of faith on the part of al-Ghazall 
in this issue. He says: 
"I apprehend that mystics were the man who 
had real experiences, not men of words. I had already 
progressed as far as possible by way of intellectual 
apprehension. What remained for me was not to be 
attained by oral instruction and study but only by 
14 immediate experience and by walking in the mystic path." 
Al-Ghazall maintains that by the practice of 
mystic way, among the things that necessarily became 
clear to him, was the true nature and special charac-
15 
teristics of prophetic revelation. He considers imme-
diate experience to be similar to actually witnessing 
a thing and taking it in one's hand. Such vision and 
16 
certainty can be found in mysticism only. 
14. Faith and Practice, P. 55 
15. Ibid., P. 63 
16. Ibid., P. 68 
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The justification of al-Ghazali's views con-
cerning testemony, reason, and intuition as the 
sources of knowledge may best be illustrated by_ an 
example that he himself cites . Suppose the belief 
at issue is that Zayd is in the house. Or one can 
reason and infer his existence from hearing his 
voice while one is outside. Or, finally, one can go 
into the house and see him for oneself, directly and 
17 
in full view. The three bases for believing that 
Zayd is in the house are: trusted testemony, inference, 
and immediate experience. 
However, in the case of religious belief what 
concerns al-Ghazali about these three ways is not 
their ability to confer truth en beliefs about God. 
That is not nee led since, for him, beliefs about God 
are already true in so far as they are revealed. No 
further epistemological justification is needed. No 
better one could be found. 
Of the three aforementioned ways dhawq (imme-
diate experience or intuition) is the best, since, it 
fulfils al-GhazalT's idea of religious belief as far 
as the believing subject is concerned. It alone is 
a mode of personal appropriation and inner commitment. 
17 . Ihya, III PP. 13-14-
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and it alone yields the accompanying certainty 
beyond doubt. 
If someone questions the validity and certainty 
of the knowledge of sufIs Ghazill would say that 
the kind of certainty that accompanies dhawq which 
he is talking about can { empirically ) only come 
to those who have gone through the moral and spiri-
tual preparations that sufIs undergo. 
C H A P T E R - V 
I ^ 
CONCLUSION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
Let us now briefly sum up the results of 
our study, and also assess and evaluate it. From 
our study of Greek Philosophy it appears that 
reason, sense-perception, and mystical experience 
were recognized by early philosophers as the 
sources of knowledge. Some rely upon the role of 
reason as the source of knowledge, while others 
based knowledge on sense-perception, i.e., experience, 
and still others could find certainty in mystical 
experience only/i.e., on intuition. Although al-
Ghazall was averse to the views of those Muslim 
thinkers who made Greek philosophy their model,he 
himself was well acquainted with it ^s . is revealed 
in his work MaqasTd al-Falaslfah ( The Aims of Philo-
sophers). He had thoroughly studied Greek philosophy. 
The epistemological views of different Greek philo-
sophers seem to have some impact on al-Ghazali's 
epistemology; none the less, his epistemology is his 
original contribution. Al-Ghazall is not against 
borrowing ideas that fit in the Islamic frame work 
from other philosophies provided that do not,in any 
way, contradict Islamic orthodoxy. Thus, it appears 
12.i 
that on some points the Ghazalian epistemology is in 
agreement with neo-Platonistic version of Greek 
tradition and also with certain Christian scholastics 
such as Augustine . 
Al-Ghazall developed his epistemological 
theories on the teachings of the Qur'an and the 
Traditions. The Qur'an itself is final world in 
revelation and its authority has to be accepted by 
every Muslim, The Traditions of the Prophet(s) also 
enjoy the status of authority. So, the concept of 
authority as one of the sources of knowledge is 
present in the Qur'an and the Traditions. Reason, 
sense-experience and inner experience, i.e., intuition 
all the three have been referred to in the Qur'an as 
the sources of knowledge. The Qur'an, in the words 
of Iqbal, for the first time laid down the main prin-
ciples of scientific induction, emphasizing the role 
of observation and experiment with regard to the 
physical world. That is ivhy, al-Ghazali has accepted 
some natural positive sciences as useful for our 
worldly life. At the same time the Qur'an encouraged 
Muslims to think and contemplate on the signs of God 
in the universe, thus, accepting the role of reason. 
1: ; u 
In no othej"- religious scripture so much emphasis 
is put on perception and reason. In accordance 
with the teachings of the Qur'an the holy Prophet(s) 
also advised and encouraged Muslims to gain knowledge 
from whichever source it was available. Hundreds 
of Traditions highlighting the value of reason and 
knowledge are found in the books of Sunna and Shi^ 
compendiums of hadith. This emphasis on the value 
of reason was instrumental in the sudden flowering 
of sciences in the Muslim world - almost a miracle 
transforming a nation of illiterate people into the 
most advanced people of the world. Thus, it seems 
that al-Ghazali was very mueh influenced from the 
study of the Qur'an and the Traditions in moulding 
his epistemological outlook. 
Al-Ghazali was well acquainted with the views 
of the different Muslim schools of thought prevailing 
before him. He had critically analyzed their notions 
in many of his writings. It is not impossible that 
he was somehow influenced or, atleast, enlightened by 
their theories of knowledge. The influence of the 
sufis' theory of knowledge has a remarkable influence 
i:u 
on al-Ghazall's epistemology. But al-Ghazall's 
contribution to episternology would be that he 
had tried to minimize the gap between intellect 
and intuition which was prevalent before hiiri. 
Al-Ghazalls another important contribution 
to episternology is of his view on the basic require-
ments of kn-;Wledge. He is possibly the first 
Muslim thinker who has elaborated this issue. 
If we critically evaluate al-Ghazall's episte-
rnology we would notice that sense-perception is not 
given due weightage by him as a source of knowledge. 
Although theoritically he accepts the role of sense-
perception in the process of cognition, it practi-
cally occupies insignificant place in his view. 
According to the teaching of the Qur'an^man endowed 
with the senses and faculty of reasoning, both of 
which are to be used by man to gain knowledge and 
to conquer it. The world, in the view of the Qur'an 
is real. Al-Ghazili's sceptical attitude towards 
the senses and human reason is a deviation from the 
Qur'an's invitation to man for employing them. 
Apart from this we can trace some resemblance 
between Ghazalian and modern epistemological approaches 
13, 
In modern epistemology we find some rationalist 
thinkers who attempt to bring out the limitations 
of empiricism. Descartes, the father of modern 
rationalism, distinguishes three classes of "ideas"* 
adventitus, factitious and innate. The first type 
comes to the mind through experience, the second 
type is constructed by the mind, and the third type, 
i.e., innate ideas, is created by God with the mind 
or soul itself. The innate ideas are inborn and 
imprinted in human soul at the time of its creation. 
The concept of the same kind of knowledge is found 
in al-Ghazall's theory of knowledge. He also talks 
about other types of knowledge which do not come 
from sense-perception. We find that in this respect 
Ghazalian epistemology has a striking similarity 
with the Cartesian theory of innate ideas. 
There is a likeness between al-Ghazall 's 
reservation regarding reason's capacity to have 
the kn.jwledge of the world supernal and the Kantian 
approach to metaphysics, Kant maintains that with 
the help of pure reason we cannot acquire genuine 
knowledge regarding the noumenal world. And thus, 
he quite clearly and unequivocally refuses to admit 
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the validity of metaphysical claims regarding self, 
universe and God. Al-Ghazall also maintains that 
these objects exist in a realm which transcends 
human perception and reason. That is why, al-
Ghazall opposed the rationalistic attempt of the 
Muslim philosophers to arrive at proofs for the 
existence of God, soul, eternity of the world, phy-
sical resurrection etc. 
According to the logical positivists, two kinds 
of sentences are literally meaningful. One is empi-
rical statement, which is contingent; the other is a 
priori statement- statements of deductive logic and 
mathematics. Since they are a priori, they are neces-
sarily true. The exponents of this school further 
add that metaphysical utterances being neither empirical 
nor a priori lack in cognitive meaning, Mataphysics is, 
therefore, meaningless. Al-Ghazall would also be in 
agreement with this school in a sense, but he would 
reconstruct knowledge on the basis of intuition. 
Hence, al-Ghazill would not agree with the logical 
positivists that God, self, supernal world etc. are 
not the problems to be d^alt with in epistemology. 
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A careful study of al-Ghazali's view of the 
different sources of knowledge will elucidate so 
many confusions which often arise in mind; it will 
throw a new light which might have been escaped from 
the notice of the scholars. Al-Ghazall attempts to 
assess the value of sense-perception, reason, intuition, 
and revelation. He realizes the importance of reason 
in order to understand the religious as well as worldly 
problems. With some reservations he accepts sense-
perception in connection with our knowledge of the 
material world. How much stress he puts on intellec-
tual pursuits and scientific method will be clarified 
if we quote the following passage from him. 
'If the soul has not been exercised in the 
sciences dealing with fact and demonstration, it will 
acquire mental phantasms which will be mistaken by it 
to be truths descending upon it ... Many sufIs remain 
stuck for years in such figments of imagination, but 
they certainly would have been saved from these, had 
they first followed the path of scientific study and 
acquired by laborious learning as much as the demonstra-
tive sciences as human power could encompass,."*. 
1. Al-Ghazall, Mizan al-^Amal, Cairo, 1342 A.H.PP.35-36 
cf. Sharif, M.M., A History of Muslim Philosophy, 
Vol. A, P. 622* 
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Besides diving knowledge into *ilm az-zahir and 
*ilm al-batin , and *ilm al-mu^malah and 'ilm al-
mukashafah,, al-Ghazall, in Maqasid al-Falasi£ah , 
makes a distinction between practical sciences 
( ^ilm al-*ainali ) and theoretical sciences ( ^ ilm 
an-nazari ). So far as the former division of 
knowledge is concerned, as we have already discussed 
in chapter II, ^ ilm az-zahir and ^ilm al-mu^malah , 
despite the minute difference between the two, may be 
considered to cover those branches of knowledge that 
are related to man's understanding of the social and 
natural phenomena. Of course, these branches of human 
knowledge require the employment of the senses and 
intellect. The other two types, i^lm al-batin ^nd 
^ilm al-mukagjjafah may be considered in general 
synonymous. These two refer to man's inner knowledge 
of himself and the ultimate reality. Obviously in 
this domain that lies beyond the reach of senses and that 
part of reason which constitutes understanding and 
reaon. It is in this area of knowledge that man's 
empirical and intellectual faculties, according to al-
Ghazali, are of little use. Nevertheless, al-Ghazall 
holds that intuition ( mukaehafah or <'ilm al-batin ) 
I'M] 
is a higher form of reason. In the terminology 
of Islamic philosophy, particularly in the phi-
losophy of al-Ghazall and sufIs, the term 'reason* 
is used in a sense broader than its ordinary con-
notation. The term 'reason* in Platonic tradition 
also embraces a broader range of psychic activity. 
Al-Ghazall and prior to him other Muslim philoso-
phers like al-Farabi and ibn Sina have been of the 
view that reason is not only a ratiocination but 
also an insight, a Divine spark, that is endowed 
with innate ideas and capable of receiving direct 
and immediate knowledge of super-natural reality. 
In this metaphysical sense, reason includes the 
faculty that is usually assigned to intuition or 
mystic experience. It is, therefore, not easy to 
term sufis and Muslim philosophers like al-Ghazall 
as rationalists or intuitionists. 
Al-Ghazall's division of knowledge into 
practical and theoretical sciences is based on dis-
tinction between the worldly and other worldly 
knowledge. I^lm al-^amali, which is usually termed 
in Muslim philosophy as hikmat al ^amali, according 
to al-Ghazali, consists of three sciences (1) the 
sciences dealing with shari^ah and politics 
13 y 
( '^ilm al-Fiqh and laws of the state), (2) the domestic 
science(^l_lm at-Tadbir al-manzil ) ^  and , (. 3 ) 
ethics .(^ iiin al-ajdila^ q ) . These three together 
comprise ^ilm al~mu^malah. Al-Ghazall regards these 
not only as useful for man's life in this world, but 
also considers them to be bearing fruits for man's life 
after death, for, with the correct understanding and 
..lanagement of worldly affairs man's conduct in society 
is beneficial for himself in both the worlds and is 
conducive to general well-being of humanity.. 
In these sciences man makes use of his perception and 
reaoning faculty but these are subordinated to the 
2 
dictates of revelation. 
The theoretical knowledge, in the view of al-
Ghazali consists of three types of knowledge: (1) meta-
physics that is called the first or supreme philosophy 
(falsafa-e-ula or i^lm al-fa^a ; (2) mathematics that 
is I . termed as intermediate or educative sciences 
( 'ilm al-awsat ) and (3) physical sciences ( *ilm at-
tabi^ah ), considered to be the lowest of sciences. In 
his view the value of these sciences is that they illu-
minate our souls with the forms existing, their laws and 
relations. This illumination helps human soul to acquire 
2. Al-Ghazall, Maqasid al-Falasifah, (Khudamlz _I;likmat-e-
Misha ) Persian tr. by Er.Muhammad' Khaza'ili,(Tehran; 
Intisharit-e- Amir Kabir, 1363 Shamsi, PP.75-75, 
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perfection and to make use of other beings in this 
world. He further elaborates the three main division 
of theoretical Knowledge by saying that the first, i.e./ 
the first philosophy ( ma ba^d at-Tabi*ah ) is not 
.concerned with material objects but with the Divine 
Essence and the essence of *aql; some parts of this 
type of knowledge deal with-the categories of existence 
( V/ajud), unity and plurality ( -^ dhdat wa Kathrat ), 
potentiality and actuality ( quwwah wa fj^ ])^  agreement 
and disagreement, universal and particular ( KullI waj'uz'iyy) 
etc. The second type is also not directly concerned 
with matter but are related to certain qualities and 
accidents, i.e., forms, quantity, and quality. These 
can be conceived independent of matter, but for their 
actual existence are dependent upon matter such line, triangl 
A 
sqjare etc. These are the notions discussed in mathe-
matics. The third type of knowledge is <3e.pendent upon 
matter.' for both their mental and external existence such 
as ijootion and rest. These form the subject matter of 
3 
physical science. 
3, Ibid., PP. 76-77 • ^  
L'jii 
Al-Ghazali has divided physical sciences into 
eight main branches and seven subsidiary branches, 
4 
details of which may be found in his wojrks.All these 
sciences illuminate man's mind and soul according 
to Muslim philosophers in general, but Ghazali makes 
distinction between them from theological view point 
as necessary, useful and useless. According these 
distinctions he diminished greatly the value of na-
tural sciences. His elaborate account of logic and 
particularl/ the value of syllogism ( qiyas ) and 
analogy ( tamthil ) is indicative of the influence 
• • 5 
of Aristotelian logic on him. Ibn Taymiyyah blames 
Ghazali for mixing Aristotelian logic with Muslim 
6 
philosophy for the first time. 
Despite following the tradition of Muslim philoso-
phers in so far as that types and division of know-
ledge are concerned, al-Ghazali made an all out effort 
to enhance the value of mystic experience at the cost 
of intellect and reason. Consequently, he, if rapt res-
ponsible for eliminating philosophyand science 
'+. Ibid.,PP. 177-78 ( ft. note }• 
5. Ibid., PP. 7-_12« ^ 
6. Hanna al-Fakhiri__and Khalil al-Jajrt, Tarikh falsafah 
dar Jahan-e-Islami , Persian___trans. ^ bd. al-Muhammad 
Ayaf1 ( Tehran: Kitab-e-Zaman,Second Print 1358 
Shamsi) Vol., P. 117' 
1 tU 
completely from the Muslim world, was instrumental 
of the decline of philosophy and science in the East 
of the Islamic world. In his view, dialectical theology 
(^ ilm al-Kalam ) is essential for common man,for 
sufism is the highest knowledge, that is the prero-
gative of the elite. 
Nevertheless, in case of the knowledge of 
the 'spiritual world' both reason and sense-perception 
fail to lead us to any information. In that case the 
role of revelation and intuition are to be accepted. 
Al-Ghazali's special contribution to epistemology lies 
in his assigning specific roles to the different 
sources of knowledge; , This analysis was not made 
by any Muslim thinker before him. His theory of 
knowledge admits the valid claims of reason and expe-
rience, and gets them integreted with the higher spi-
ritual yearnings of man at the levels of intuition or 
its higher form, i.e., revelation. 
In connection with the nature of knowledge 
al-Ghazall's view is, to some extent, clear. He 
accepts the things of the 'phenomenal world' as the 
objects of knowledge. But the question of the status 
of appearance as against reality i,e. sense-data versus 
14 
physical objects, is also discussed by al-Ghazall. 
3y this, he, like the critical realists, wants to 
say that our perceptual faculties cannot perceive a 
particular object as it is. The 'Supernal world*, 
according to al-Ghazali, lies beyond the reach of 
the majority of men. The object of that world can 
only be cognized by prophets and mystics. Since 
the natures of the phenomenal and the spiritual worlds 
are different, the ways through which they are known 
cannot be uniform. That is one of the important 
points which al-Ghazali making out in his epistemological 
reasearch. 
The problem of justification is the most 
crucial problem in epistemology. Al-Ghazali himself 
also puts stress on the justification of the validity 
of knowledge. With reference to the validity of 
empirical and rational knowledge, his stand is, to 
some extent, similar to that of the exponents of the 
correspondence and coherence theories of truths or 
knowledge, respectively. 
The difficulty he would, perhaps, face in the 
justification of the supra-intellectual knowledge,i.e.. 
1 '* 4j 
revealed and intuitive knowledge. These two ways 
of knowing are very much convincing to al-Ghazall, 
Revealed knowledge is the privilege of prophets. 
Al-Ghazall being a mystic, finds certainty in the 
revealed and intuitive knowledge. But what weight 
they do have in the eyes of non-mystics is a question 
he did not put attention to. Al-Ghazali himself 
realizes the difficulty of non-mystics in understanding 
the nature of these two types of knowledge. Because 
non-mystic will seek intellectual justification of 
all kinds of knowledge. Al-Ghazali's point here is 
that the intuitive and revealed knowledge being 
different from the intellectual knowledge, there 
will be no uniformity in the methods of justification 
of these. Al-Ghazall would add that the justifica-
tion or validity of mystic experience can only be 
understood by those who have morally and spiritually 
prepared themselves following the sufi path*. 
Post-Ghazallan Muslim thinkers, were very 
much influenced by al-Ghazali's theory of knowledge. 
It had a great imoact on Ibn Tufail's ( d.581 A.H./ 
1185 A.D.) theory of knowledge. He, following al-
Ghazall, accepts the role of sense-perception in the 
143 
7 
acquisition of knowledge of the sensuous objects. 
According to Ibn Tufail, sense-perception, reason 
and intuition are the bases of philosophical know-
ledge. He holds that Prophets too have intuitions; 
their main source of knowledge is revelation from God. 
The knowledge of the prophet is direct and personal, 
p 
but that of the followers is constituted of testimony. 
At the end we may say that - al-Ghazali's 
epistemology is not free from limitations. His major 
drawbacks, in the words of Iqbal, is that it demolished 
the basis of philosophical and scientific knowledge, but 
could not provide any other sense ground for them. Hence, 
of it soma critics al-Ghazali hold him responsible for the 
decline of philosophy and science in the Muslim world, 
they may n )t be brushed aside as making Bn unjustifiable 
claim. Had Ibn Rushd not refuted al-Ghazall's main 
arguments against the philosophers in Tahafutal- Falasifah, 
this work of Ghazali wo-ild have proved to be the last "^ i^l 
in the coffin of philosophy. Al-Ghazali's strong point 
is his analytical tool and insight which was later 
employed more successfully by his critic, Ibn Rushd, on 
7. Sharif, Qp;Git , p. 534 
8. Ibid., P. 537 
14'. 
the one hand, and those who accepted the role 
of m/stical experience in acquisiticrn of know-
ledqe, such as Kulla Sadr ad-Din ShlrizI , known 
as 1^^lllla Sadra, on the other, Tne total eclipse of 
philosophy in the Eastern Muslim world was effec-
tively averted by the Iranian tradition of Hikmat 
• 9 
philosophy, a synthesis of ^irfan and reason. 
It is in this context that Ghazalian theory of 
knowledge regains some relevance to the latter 
development of Muslim thought. 
=5, Dr. Wahid Akhtar, "Sabzawari's Analysis of 
Being", Al-Tawhid 'I.P. n. Tehran ), vol.2, 
I, PP. 19-20. 
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